On the 33rd anniversary of the glorious Yemeni unity of May 22, 1990, it must be emphasized that Yemeni unity was a great and historical event in the life of our Yemeni people. It is the fruit of the struggle of the Yemeni national movement since the forties of the twentieth century. Likewise, in the south, the Yemeni unity has been since the National Pact in 1963, through the programs of the political organization of the National Bloc, and the Yemeni Socialist Party. Unity was a major goal and a great struggle demand, and so, the whole world witnessed the overwhelming joy of the Yemeni people on May 22, 1990, when they were celebrating their most important achievement at the end of the twentieth century.

The transitional phase was the golden phase in the age of unity, and also the first parliamentary elections in April 1993 were the only elections that were the most transparent and fair in the history of Yemeni elections.

However, this unity did not satisfy the aspirations of the traditional powers and the forces of influence and power, as the Constitution of the Unity State was full of many rights for citizens. It was a constitution that established for a true democratic state. Nevertheless, this frightened the powers of influence, the “deep state,” from the growing role of the constitution, law, and judiciary at the expense of customs and the role of the tribe in politics and power. Therefore, immediately after the 1994 war, more than 80 articles, all related to citizen rights, were deleted, while the president was given absolute powers. The implementation of the constitution also means removing the hands of the influential people from public money and state property, in addition to what many of the influential forces were hiding in their own intent in seizing the public sector of the southern state and the lands that were the property of the state.

Beginning of Deviation from Unity Path

In 1992, the political assassinations began, and it was terrorism in the literal sense of the word. On September 10, the Yemeni author and writer, Omar Al-Jawi, was targeted and injured, and so the engineer Hassan Ali Al-Huraibi, head of the Yemeni Unionist Assembly party organization (Al-Tajammu’ al-Wahdawi al-Yamani) was killed in the capital, Sana'a. Then, followed by a series of assassinations of members and cadres of the Yemeni Socialist Party, the partner in achieving Yemeni unity, the matter escalated into a conflict, as a result of which the unjust war of 1994 erupted, which excluded the partner, the leadership of the Socialist Party, its cadres and members, and drove them out of Yemen.

It is clear that the achievement of Yemeni unity by the two ruling parties in the north and south, headed by Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Salem Al-Beidh, Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party, did not receive the necessary arrangements and study, and further, the situation of each side, at that time, was not discussed separately: its problems, its preferences, and most importantly, to work to address the issues and grievances in the two parts and to achieve community unity, its interaction, and its participation in the development.

Moreover, the existence of social and political grievances in each part did not support the deepening of the idea of ​​unity and the importance of assembling human capital and uniting the forces of society, its classes, and social groups around the project of unity.

On the other hand, the Brotherhood, in the leadership of the Socialist Party, stipulated—or so it was said—on the Day of Unity that the southern leaders who took refuge in Sana’a in 1986 should leave it, in order to enter it.

This was one of the first issues of unity. Therefore, addressing the results of the previous events and coups in the north and south as a condition for entering unity with a unified citizenship, should have taken place before declaring unity, so that these problems do not arise again as an obstacle to the continuation of unity.

What are the main reasons for the failure of the unity project?

1.  The absence of a development project, based on long, medium and short-term strategies, that would result in the establishment of community systems.

Such as the educational system: What kind of education do we want? What citizen do we want? Then, defining a clear-cut economic policy, strategies for building development projects, and to which sectors the investments are directed. However, the leaders did not have a development project to develop the country and get it out of its state of poverty and backwardness.

Unity has turned into the ambitions of part of the leadership, to seize the state public sector, as unity was achieved under the collapse of the socialist system and the promotion of a market economy. So, the enterprises of this sector had to be seized and privatized illegally.

Further, there was a constitution for the unity state, and a referendum was held on it, and it contained many citizenship rights. This constitution was a value system for building the institutional system of the state. However, the development project is a philosophy, policies, and strategies that were not available for the unity state.

2. The bilateral leaders entered the unity with conflicting interests and intentions. Besides, there was no civilizational development project that brought them together, but rather, all their thinking was focused on sharing power.

Hence, the state has been reduced to the sharing project, as if the unity was this only, as if the unity was nothing but the management of sharing. According to some signs that all people know, the unity has turned into an ambitions by part of the leadership to seize the state public sector, as unity was achieved under the collapse of the socialist system and the promotion of a market economy. So, the enterprises of this sector had to be seized and privatized illegally.

This also led to the seizure of state lands, then, the public sector employees and workers of the agricultural and fish cooperative sector were laid off, their salaries stopped, and the cooperative lands were seized.

3. Demobilization of the southern army, mostly in a systematic manner, perhaps in response to the desires of the regional countries that did not want an army with a different fighting doctrine. However, the first to lead the protests in Aden were the military retirees, who felt aggrieved and were forcibly dismissed.
4. Appointments to important positions in the southern governorates, in spite of the fact that the cadres from the north had less administrative experience than their southern colleagues, who turned them into the "Stay at Home" party.
5. Governmental and nationalized buildings were seized and distributed among those who are close to President Saleh's circle and some sheikhs.

6. When Vice President Ali Salem Al-Beidh began to protest and reject the behavior of plundering and seizing that Saleh followed, he was bypassed, and Saleh did not pay attention to his remarks, as if Saleh and his clique wanted to provoke Al-Beidh and his clique to remove them from power once and for all, which was achieved in the unjust war of 1994, which was waged against the southern governorates, which later became a reason for rejecting unity and demanding secession.
7. Starting in the post-war year, popular protests began. At that time, it was possible to address the problems caused by Saleh's policies, which contradict the spirit of unity and equal Yemeni citizenship, but Saleh was proud of the victory in 1994, and his arrogance increased by the fact that he no longer had opponents inside the country.

However, this arrogance and underestimation of people's demands led to the spread of protests and the evolution of their slogans from rights demands to political demands and then to calls for the secession of the South. Accordingly, the problem expanded and became difficult to solve, and Saleh was no longer able to control the Southern Movement. Then, the political and social parties and forces entered the front line with the regime and acknowledged the existence of southern grievances caused by the policies of Saleh and his allies, and those policies require a review of the state's administrative system.

In fact, the central state is no longer desirable, and it is the cause of these grievances. In addition to that, the southern issue has guided us to the solution of the federal state, to avoid conflicts and cycles of violence over the distribution of power and wealth.

It is clear that the 2015 war, which is the second war waged by the Houthis and the Saleh alliance against the south, has widened social rifts and increased southerners' discontent with unity. Of course, unity is not the cause of these wars and grievances, but rather the political system and the influential powers that tampered with the unity project, and the ones who practiced the spoils policy with the south. So, the southerners became fanatical about secession as a result of the wrong mobilization, which turned into a burden on the southern movement and the transitional council. Further, whoever currently talks about the solution of the federal state becomes a traitor to the Southern case. Of course, politicians know that Yemen's federal solution is a tried-and-tested solution to eliminate tensions and social conflicts over power and wealth, but it is already too late, and secession complicates all solutions, and sometimes makes them impossible.

Today we need a quiet conversation, to consider the advantages and disadvantages of federalism as well as the advantages and disadvantages of secession— if there are advantages of it, and which are impossible. But first we need to abolish the awareness of hatred against everything that is northern, whereas hatred from any side, has nothing to do with unity or secession. However, hatred is the easiest way to massacre, fight, and commit all violations, because of this incitement, which has no meaning other than fueling strife.

As for unity and secession, they can be discussed quietly, away from fanaticism and tension. We are in the Yemeni Unionist Assembly Party, where the Supreme Committee of the Party decided in April 2013 on a federation system of two regions, north and south, and so did the Yemeni Socialist Party. Likewise, before all of us, in November 2011, the Cairo conference decided on the two-region project.

It is imperative to stop the war and enter into a deep dialogue between the Yemeni parties. No one but the Yemenis themselves will decide the fate of their country and rebuild the democratic federal state that guarantees citizenship and human rights.