Through this analysis, we aim to scrutinize a series of key events, milestones, transformations, and facts that have impacted the state of the Yemeni military institution and its roles. All derived from the relevant references, testimonies, documents, and researches related to Yemeni armed forces issues, despite their scarcity, taking into account the historical sequence, accuracy, and reliability. Beginning with the formation phase in the mid-eighteenth century during the British occupation of South Yemen and the Ottoman occupation of its north, and passing through the legacies of the political conflict cycles following the September and October revolutions. In addition to scrutinizing the repercussions of these conflicts on the status of the Yemeni military institution and on its general status, challenges, distortions, structures, creed, roles, and operations. All this is approached comprehensively, considering each aspect within its current context, introductions, trajectory, and outcomes.
Despite the multitude of events and transformations that Yemen has witnessed over the past decades, researchers face a primary dilemma characterized by the scarcity of references and specialized studies, as well as the meticulous documentation of information, testimonials, and documents, including memoirs, regarding numerous events. This challenge is primarily attributed to the enforced isolation that has surrounded Yemen over many decades, followed by systematic processes of intentional obliteration of the collective memory accompanying the multiple cycles of conflict. Additionally, the absence of national institutions concerned with memory, documentation, studies, and knowledge production, coupled with the reluctance of many Yemeni figures to write their memoirs and testimonials except on rare occasions, intensified the dilemma. This can be attributed to the forced silencing imposed by authoritarian structures and their subsequent persecution, or to the avoidance of contributing to power-seeking endeavors to exploit and manipulate historical events through certificates. This reluctance could also stem from the fear of reprisals by those affected by these testimonies, whose influence has lasted for decades after the events, or from the aspiration to assume new roles from positions of authority until their death, without underestimating the seriousness of the collective tendency and backlash against the disclosures exposing public issues, with all their preliminaries, contents, and outcomes, for study, research, and scrutiny. This is all transpiring amidst a lack of awareness of the value of knowledge, memory, and disclosure, contributing to the revitalization of societies.
"When researching and delving into the definitions and components of the state, many literary works and geopolitical studies indicate that one of its crucial pillars lies in the state's capacity to monopolize legitimate means of violence (strength) within the framework of the military institution."
A theoretical Introduction
The State and Its Pillars: Indicators of Fragility and Strength
When researching and delving into the definitions and components of the state, many literary works and geopolitical studies indicate that one of its essential pillars lies in the state's capacity to monopolize legitimate means of violence within the framework of the military institution. In accordance with Max Weber's conceptualization of the state as 'a power for people over people, based on the monopoly of legitimate violence,' it can be asserted that the most serious and profound existential threat to any state and society is essentially the incapacity of its military and security institutions to fulfill their basic duties adequately, posing a threat to its potential collapse and disintegration.
Delving into the concept of the state and focusing on one of its essential pillars—the military institution—does not underestimate the significance of the other indispensable pillars essential for the existence and continuity of the national state, represented by the state of the people, a state characterized by justice and well-being, but rather is an attempt to shed light on this basic pillar, which serves as the guarantor for the existence of the other pillars and the nation-state itself.
In a broader context, defining the strong and effective state, whose existence is built upon and contingent upon a social contract, involves the acquisition of legitimate authority. This authority provides high levels of security against political and criminal violence, safeguards political, civil, economic, and social liberties for citizens, ensures the proficient management of physical infrastructure, and enforces the rule of law. In addition, it guarantees economic growth, human development, individual freedoms, transparency, accountability, and good governance in the execution of its powers.
Fragile State Indicators
The significance of state fragility indicators lies in their role as a precise diagnostic tool, contributing to the formulation of effective policies related to conflict, security, and development. Hence, the United Nations characterizes fragility as a key challenge in achieving Millennium Development Goals and as a threat to global security.
A fragile and failed state is one that is "incapable of maintaining itself as a member of the international community," where the "central government loses its monopoly on the use of force," according to researchers Helman and Ratner. These states witness the "decay of their central governments, the rise of tribal and regional spheres, the spread of diseases, and the increasing prevalence of war," as described by the American scholar Robert David Kaplan, an expert in geopolitical and future studies. The key features of fragile states also include the collapse of law and order, where state institutions lose their monopoly on the legitimate use of force, either becoming incapable of protecting their citizens or being used to suppress and terrorize them. Additionally, fragile states are characterized by a weak or absent capacity to meet the needs of their citizens, provide essential public services, ensure the well-being of their citizens, support economic activity, and a loss of credibility in representing the state internationally.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a fragile state is characterized by a lack of capacity to develop constructive and mutually beneficial relationships with the community. Additionally, these states are more vulnerable to various shocks, whether internal or external, such as economic crises or natural disasters.
Yemen and the State Fragility Index
To test the determinants of state fragility through the Yemeni case, it is crucial to heed and recall the warnings issued by numerous specialized international reports. These reports consistently highlight that Yemen is heading towards becoming a fragile and failed state. This trajectory is attributed to the evasion of commitments to economic, administrative, political, structural, military, and security reforms by the regime of Saleh, which ruled Yemen for almost three decades. These warnings have been present since the late twentieth century, coinciding with the deepening and broadening of crises on multiple fronts. The deteriorating condition of the Yemeni army, characterized by decay and erosion, and the fragility of security institutions stand out as stark manifestations of these glaring crises.
In accordance with the Global Fragility Index data, an annual report published by the U.S. Peace Fund and Foreign Policy magazine since 2005, Yemen has consistently topped the list as the top-ranked fragile state globally since 2019. This has persisted for five consecutive years across all indicators. Notably, Yemen's ranking experienced fluctuations from the 24th to the 8th position between 2006 and 2014, as reported by the Index.
Since 2015, Yemen has begun to leap forward in the ranks of fragile states, starting from the seventh position in the same year, then reaching the fourth position in the years 2016 and 2017, and coming in third place in 2018.
The indicators of fragile states comprise twelve indices, starting with the security index, followed by the elite division index, political and social schisms, economic deterioration indicators, unequal economic development, human migration, brain drain, authority legitimacy, public services, human rights, demographic pressures, internally displaced persons, and homeless populations, in addition to external interventions.
In the context of this approach, it is possible to highlight the three key indicators for fragile states based on the Global Fragility Index before delving into the presentation of the crucial milestones, events, and conclusions related to Yemen's state formation, current status, and existence, including the subject of this paper, which is an approach to the situation of the Yemeni armed forces, which are:
Key Criteria for Modern Armies Strength
Here, we briefly review the top ten fundamental criteria from a wide range of standards for the modern armies strength, such as constitutional and legal legitimacy, governance and accountability, unity of command and control, combat doctrine, neutrality and independence, effectiveness and eligibility of human resources, quality of training and experience, armament and technology, strength of logistics systems, and intelligence capabilities.
Additionally, this paper provides a chronological overview of key stations and events, primarily serving as headings, given their impact on the development of the Yemeni armed forces, with some emphasis on the most crucial ones, categorizing them into four essential chronological stages, outlining the formation of modern Yemen. The first phase spanned from the years 1839 and 1849 until 1962 and 1967, during which Yemen, both south and north, fell under the two occupations of the British and the Ottomans. During this period, Yemen rediscovered itself, its existence, identity, and characteristics, shaping its modern national movement. The second phase, spanning from 1962 to 1990, started with the September and October revolutions, passing through four decades of transformations and struggles that laid the foundation for the modern Yemeni state and the task of bridging the huge inherited gaps. During those decades, Yemen faced many important gains as well as, with them, many serious failures, which left Yemen facing existential threats and challenges. The third phase extended from 1990 to 2010, which began with the declaration of unity and the establishment of the Republic of Yemen. This phase was marked by missed transformational opportunities, structural imbalances, and escalating challenges, during which Yemen topped the indicators of fragility and failure, which were inputs to the fourth stage, which extends from 2011 to 2023, in which Yemen was subjected to serious pitfalls, pushing it into the abyss of fragmentation and disintegration.
"The roots of the formation phase of the Yemeni military institution extend back to the second quarter of the 19th century, when Yemen fell under two occupations, simultaneously, the British occupation in the south, and the Ottoman occupation in the north."
The First Phase:
It extended from the years 1839 and 1849 and continued until 1962 and 1967.
Glimpse of the formation phase
Two occupations, two regions, along with sultans and imams
The roots of the formation phase of the Yemeni military institution date back to the second quarter of the 19th century, when Yemen fell under two occupations simultaneously. On January 19, 1839, Britain occupied the city of Aden and other southern regions of Yemen, sparking armed waves of national resistance in its first days. During the period of the British’s occupation of southern Yemen, northern Yemen also endured Ottoman occupation for the second time, starting in 1849, facing its own waves of popular resistance. In 1914, a treaty was signed between the British and Ottoman occupations, dividing Yemen into North and South for the first time in its history. The Ottoman occupation of northern Yemen continued until 1918. However, a few years earlier, the Da'an Treaty was reached in 1911, which paved the way for Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din to emerge as a religious and political figure who would later govern northern Yemen after the Ottoman withdrawal.
Due to the British colonial need to establish local formations to assist in subjugating the population, the "First Yemeni Battalion" was formed in 1918 under the command of British Colonel Neil Leake. It included 400 Yemeni soldiers, including thirteen officers, from both southern and northern Yemen. However, the battalion was disbanded in 1925 after Yemeni soldiers killed Lieutenant Lawrence on the island of Mayun in 1923. Following this incident, Yemeni soldiers left the island and went to the Jebel Sheikh Saeed area in Bab el Mandeb, then proceeded to northern Yemen. This event prompted the British colonial forces to reassess the loyalty of Yemeni soldiers. Consequently, the British established regional armies, such as the Aden Protectorate Forces, Tribal Guards, Government Guards, Lahij Regular Army, Mahra Regular Army, Armed Qahtani Police, Armed Kathiri Police, Hadhrami Desert Army, and the reinforcement of sultanates, emirates, and sheikhdoms in Lahij, Shabwa, Mukalla, Sayun, Abyan, Dhale, Sabiha, and others. This culminated in the formation of the South Arabian Federation Army (1959–1967) until the spark of the October 14th Revolution in 1963, leading to the departure of the last British soldier on November 30, 1967, marking the end of 128 years of colonization.
In parallel, Imam Yahya, in turn, established the "Muzaffar Army" in December 1918, aided by Ottoman Empire officers and soldiers who hadn't left Yemen. He further proceeded to form the "Defensive Regular Army," alongside the Barani Army ( the tribal). Imam Yahya engaged in numerous wars with Yemeni tribes in the north, including the 1934 conflict with Saudi Arabia and border skirmishes with the English. In addition to these wars, his forces undertook tax collection duties and safeguarded the Imam's influence. Therefore, the inherent nature of the Imamate system, marked by its conservatism and seclusion, hindered the development of a robust and modern regular army aligned with contemporary military principles. At that time, the status of the military mirrored the challenges faced by various other institutions in the state and society, spanning economics, education, services, and politics.
In late 1936, Imam Yahya sent ten students to study at the Iraqi Military School in Baghdad. One of them, Abdullah Al-Sallal, later became the first president of the Yemen Arab Republic. In 1937, another group of ten students was sent, who later formed the nucleus for movements against the imamate system. In 1940, Iraq sent a military mission to Yemen to train and develop Imam Yahya's army. As the circle of opposition to Imam Yahya's rule expanded, culminating in the establishment of the Free Yemeni Party in Aden in 1944, Sheikh Ali Nasser Al-Qardai and his companions executed an assassination operation on February 17, 1948, known as the Constitutional Movement of '48, resulting in the deaths of Imam Yahya, his Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Umari, and one of his grandsons. This movement was marked by the involvement of officers from the first and second missions to Iraq. However, Imam Ahmed managed to suppress this movement, allowing the city of Sanaa to be open to tribes for seven days. During this period, houses, shops, and mosques were looted and destroyed. Imam Ahmed filled his prisons with hundreds of people who took part in the movement, executing 29 prominent leaders, including the Iraqi Army's General Commander, Jamal Jameel.
On March 30, 1955, Ahmed Yahya Al-Thulaya, the army commander in Taiz, besieged the palace of Imam Ahmed in the Al-Urdhi area with 600 soldiers, forcing him to relinquish power to his brother Abdullah, who had joined the Al-Thulaya rebellion. While the leaders of the 55 Movement were reassured by the end of his rule after signing a written abdication, Imam Ahmed mobilized support among the sheikhs of Taiz and northern regions, the tribal army, and the palace guards. He successfully quelled the movement, executed its leader, and those involved, including his brothers Abdullah and Abbas, reclaiming authority.
After the failure of the 1955 movement, several Yemeni officers actively engaged in planning the assassination of Imam Ahmed in Hodeidah. Building on the experiences of the 1948 and 1955 movements, a group of military officers formally established the "Free Officers Organization" in December 1961. This organization included officers from Sana'a, Hodeidah, and Taiz, as well as students from the Military School in Sana'a. Their goal was to overthrow the Imamate system and establish a republican regime. Two months prior to the September revolution, the Free Officers Organization expanded its formal engagement and communication, encompassing the national political civil movement opposing the Imamate system.
Throughout this period, Yemen underwent a rediscovery of its self, existence, identity, characteristics, and both internal and external connections. This era witnessed the emergence of the modern Yemeni nationalist movement, tasked with laying the groundwork for the September and October revolutions and facilitating their realization.
“Given the significance of the events and transformations witnessed by Yemen since the mid-nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century, the September and October revolutions stand out as the most prominent and crucial historical turning points on all levels.”
The Second Phase: From 1962 to 1990
The September and October Revolutions
The struggle of the early foundations of the modern state and the bloody cycles of conflict
Given the significance of the events and transformations in Yemen since the mid-nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century, the September and October revolutions stand out as the most prominent and crucial historical turning points on all levels. They laid the initial foundations for achieving the desired transition towards the envisioned modern state on the relevance of all revisions and critiques that approximate the mistakes that accompanied the two revolutions, which hindered the fulfillment of their complete promises, notably the primary objective shared by both revolutions: "Building a strong national army to protect the country, guard the revolution, and secure its gains," which was the second goal of the September revolution, while the ninth goal of the October revolution was "Establishing a strong popular national army with modern requirements, capable of fully protecting the gains and objectives of the revolution."
Despite the numerous challenges and crises faced by the republican system that emerged after the overthrow of the Imamate rule, following the success of the September 26, 1962 revolution, the September Revolution system broke the isolation barriers that had plagued northern Yemen for decades. The Yemen Arab Republic in northern Yemen witnessed significant leaps in various aspects of life, but it also confronted a series of challenges and crises in its early years. The newborn republican system faced consecutive blows and a series of internal and external, heavy challenges. This ranged from the killing of prominent revolutionary leaders like Ali Abdulmughni, the intervention of Egyptian forces supporting the revolution, their dominance, and later, their sudden and perplexing withdrawal after the setback of June 1967. This was followed by the November 5, 1967 coup, which ousted Marshal Abdullah Al-Sallal, the first president of the republic (1962-1967), five years after the revolution, with Judge Abdulrahman Al-Iryani succeeding him as the head of the republican council.
One of the most dangerous challenges faced by the Republican regime was the tragic and bloody events between two factions of the Republican forces on August 23 and 24, 1968. This occurred seven months after the success of the republican forces in breaking the 70-day siege imposed by royal forces on the capital, Sanaa. Following this success, a group of prominent military leaders were exiled, and then later, Major Abdulraqeeb Abdulwahab, the commander of the Thunderbolt Forces and the Chief of General Staff, was assassinated upon his return from exile in Algeria at the beginning of 1969. These events, marked by their regional implications, also represented a complete retreat from the promises and principles of the revolution. The traditional power centers took control of the republican regime by eliminating many modernization figures, whose negative effects extended to the state and society for decades to come.
Prior to this period, northern Yemen underwent an extensive eight-year conflict between the forces of the Republican regime, backed by Egyptian support on one side, and the forces loyal to the Imamate regime, backed by Saudi Arabia, on the other. The conflict concluded with the declaration of reconciliation in March 1970 between the Republicans and Royalists, following the exclusion of the Hamid al-Din family. This was followed by Saudi Arabia's official recognition of the Republican regime.
With the success of the September revolution, Engineer Qahtan Al-Shaabi decided to return to Sanaa, and then he was appointed as an advisor to President Abdullah Al-Sallal for the affairs of the occupied south. In February 1963, from Sanaa, he announced the establishment of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South Yemen, with Qahtan becoming its Secretary-General. Following their participation in the fight alongside September revolutionaries against royalist forces, British occupation forces attacked, on the morning of October 14, a group of fighters returning from the Mahabishah region in the governorate of Hajjah, situated in the Radfan region. In the attack, Rajeh Ghalib Labouza and one of his comrades were killed, and four others were injured. This incident prompted Qahtan Al-Shaabi and his deputy Nasser Al-Saqqaf, leaders of the National Front in North Yemen, to declare a statement announcing the start of the Liberation of the South revolution on October 14, 1963.
With the withdrawal of the last British soldier from Aden on November 30, 1967, and the declaration of the establishment of the Republic of South Yemen, later renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the initial phases of building the regular armed forces in a systematic manner began as an independent military, equipped with institutionalized military structures capable of ensuring security and fulfilling military defense responsibilities.
In October 1978, the formation of the Yemeni Socialist Party was announced in Aden, following the integration of leftist political factions from both northern and southern Yemen after lengthy consultations spanning several years. The alliance between the governing regime and the socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union, had a significant impact on the construction of the state and the revolutionary institutions, fundamentally different from their regional context. These developments were not immune to the Cold War and its consequences, including conflicts with Western systems, their dominance, and their allied regimes in the region. Amidst the aspirations fueled by the romanticism and promises of exporting the revolution, along with its values and ideology as a fundamental factor, the relationships of the socialist state remained in constant tension with its regional neighbors, all the way to the repercussions from the aging of the ruling elite in Moscow, its internal disparities, and ultimately culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on the overall situation in southern Yemen.
Amidst all the foundational achievements accomplished by the Yemeni Socialist Party system, starting from unifying over twenty sultanates, emirates, and sheikhdoms to establishing an efficient centralized system and undergoing remarkable transformations within a record timeframe in education, social justice, modernization, women's empowerment, and the establishment of the rule of law, however, the governance issues and power struggles emerged as prominent features overshadowing these gains. Southern Yemen witnessed rounds of deadly ideological conflicts, with the exception of a brief period under the leadership of engineer Qahtan Al-Shaabi, the first president of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which commenced on November 30, 1967, and concluded with his removal and arrest on June 22, 1969, in addition to the years of his successor’s rule; President Salem Rabie Ali, which ended with his liquidation on June 26, 1978.
Wars in North and South Yemen
Over the years, the relationship between the two parts of Yemen has witnessed escalating tension, particularly after the tragic events of August. In the aftermath of the traditional power centers' takeover in Sana’a, the regime in Aden resorted to supporting armed struggle, known as the Front Wars, in the central regions. This support was channeled through backing the "Progressives" formations via the "People's Army" and the "Revolutionary Resisters' Organization." Subsequently, the support was extended to the formation of the "Democratic National Front," formed in 1976 with its main headquarters based in Aden, with the aim of overthrowing the "reactionary regime" in Sanaa and achieving Yemeni unity. Amidst this tense context, armed clashes erupted between the northern regime forces and the southern regime forces along the borders of the two regions in early October 1972. In the aftermath of this, southern forces seized the city of Qa'ataba, leading to military confrontations along the border lasting for days. The clashes concluded with the announcement of the Cairo Agreement on October 28, 1972, signed by the prime ministers of both regions, Mohsen al-Aini and Ali Nasser Mohammed. Subsequently, the signing of the Tripoli Statement on November 28, 1972, took place between the two parts of Yemen (signed by President Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, president of the Republican Council, and Salem Rubai Ali, president of the Presidency Council in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), under the auspices of Libyan President Muammar Al-Gaddafi. This marked the first agreement towards the unification of the two parts.
“Starting with the meeting that brought them together in the city of Qa'ataba, which entirely opened a new page in Yemen's history, the relations between the two parts of Yemen witnessed an unprecedented improvement during the years of the presidency of Salem Rubaie Ali and Al-Hamdi.”
Two Presidents for Peace, Development and Unity
Salem Rubaie Ali “Salemeen” and Ibrahim Mohammed Al-Hamdi
A year and four months after independence, a large-scale arrest operation took place within the ranks of the radical wing of the National Front, known as the March 20 Movement. On June 22, 1969, Salem Rubai Ali "Salemeen" led the Correctional Movement, along with the "Mountain Group," which ousted President Qahtan Al-Shaabi from the presidency of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South and appointed Salemeen as his successor, who was influenced by the experience of the Chinese revolution. Salemeen's era was characterized by societal enlightenment, supporting education, enhancing social justice, backing marginalized groups, establishing agricultural cooperatives against feudalism, and leading the nationalization of economic facilities and housing. President Salemeen's communication with Judge Abdulrahman Al-Iryani, the head of the Republican Council in North Yemen, resulted in the cessation of hostilities and the declaration of the "Cairo Agreement" in 1972, followed by holding the "Tripoli Summit" later in that year, a meeting in Algeria in the next year, and another meeting in Taiz in 1973. These series of meetings aimed at establishing mechanisms for the unification of the two parts of Yemen at that time.
On June 13, 1974, Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Al-Hamdi announced the leadership of a corrective movement in which he assumed the presidency of the northern part of Yemen, succeeding President Al-Iryani. After about twelve years of internal and external challenges, crises, and conflicts that the republican regime faced, and in a completely different direction from what resulted from the events of August, he embarked on bold structural reform steps and focused his efforts on building the institutions of a state of order, law, and infrastructure, taking the initiative to calm internal conflicts, and achieving independence through national decision-making. He launched a broad development path within the framework of what was known as cooperatives. On April 27, 1975, he issued decisions that overthrew many of the leaders representing the traditional power centers within the army and security apparatus, removed many tribal sheikhs from senior positions in the state, and abolished the interests of the tribal sheikhs within the framework of reducing the influence of the traditional power centers and addressing the aftermath of chaos and unrest.
Starting with the meeting that brought them together in the city of Qa'ataba, which entirely opened a new page in Yemen's history, the relations between the two parts of Yemen witnessed an unprecedented improvement during the years of the presidency of Salem Rubaie Ali and Al-Hamdi. This elevated the aspirations of Yemenis for peace, development, stability, unity, and a robust state.
On the other hand, President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi presided over a presidential-level quadrilateral summit for Red Sea-bordering countries, held on Sunday, March 20, 1977, in the city of Taiz. The summit addressed the issue of Red Sea security and saw the participation of Sudan's President Jaafar Nimeiri, Somalia's Mohamed Siad Barre, and South Yemen's President Salem Robay Ali. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were notably absent from the summit. One of the key outcomes of this meeting was the formation of a specialized security and developmental system for the Red Sea region.
Actually, these transformations, as a whole, made President Al-Hamdi and his project the target of a treacherous assassination plot. This plot involved various local, regional, and international actors and took place on the evening of October 11, 1977, claiming the life of President Al-Hamdi and his brother Abdullah Al-Hamdi. A few months later, a planned execution took place in Aden ( Salemeen), on June 26, 1978, accusing him of involvement in the assassination of Ahmed Al-Ghashmi, the President of North Yemen.
The Heavy Year of Al-Ghashmi's Leadership
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Hussein Al-Ghashmi, Chief of the Army Staff and Deputy Chairman of the Command Council (Presidency of the State), and one of the main suspects in the assassination of Al-Hamdi, assumed the presidency of North Yemen, succeeding President Al-Hamdi. The most important events that North Yemen witnessed during his presidency, which lasted no more than a year, were the return of North Yemen to the spirit of the August events. Particularly noteworthy was the aftermath of the liquidation of the paratrooper forces, which President Al-Hamdi had integrated into the Thunderbolt forces under the command of Major Abdullah Abdulalem. The latter, at that time, directed the paratrooper forces from Sanaa to the Hujariya region, south of Taiz, rebelling against Al-Ghashmi's authority. In response, Major Ali Abdullah Saleh, commander of the Taiz Brigade, led a widespread military campaign that ended with the withdrawal of the paratrooper forces and their commander to South Yemen. Upon their arrival in Lahij, they were welcomed by the Minister of Interior, Saleh Musleh, accompanied by soldiers and officers from the southern paratrooper forces. Subsequently, Abdullah Abdulalim left the capital, Aden, for the Syrian capital, Damascus, and remained moving between Damascus, Libya, and Cairo for nearly four decades until his death in Cairo on January 17, 2022. He carried with him a wealth of important details regarding pivotal events in the contemporary history of Yemen that had not been disclosed.
On June 24, 1978, a presidential envoy from Aden transported a booby-trapped briefcase to President Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi, assassinating him in his office at the General Command Headquarters of the Army in the capital, Sanaa. Despite President Salemeen immediately vowing revenge for al-Ghashmi's assassination, accusations were directed at the leadership of the regime in Aden. In the aftermath, the Arab League held an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to formulate an Arab stance against the ruling regime in Aden, implicating it in the aforementioned assassination. Fifteen Arab countries announced the diplomatic severance of ties with the Aden government. The day following the assassination, the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party convened an extraordinary meeting under Arab pressure, holding President Salemeen responsible for al-Ghashmi's assassination and deciding to oust him. Then, a hasty party trial was conducted, resulting in the execution of President Salemeen and several officers on June 26, 1978.
Meanwhile, in the capital Sanaa, a presidential council was formed under the chairmanship of AbdulKareem Abdullah Al-Arashi, the President of the Constituent People's Assembly, with membership comprising Ali Al-Sheiba, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, and Ali Abdullah Saleh. This council remained in charge of managing the situation for only a few weeks.
“In less than three months after Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed the presidency, on October 15, 1978, military and civilian members of the Nasserist organization led an attempted coup, which Saleh was able to successfully thwart, leading subsequently to the trial and execution of dozens of Nasseriste leaders.”
The First Phase of Saleh's Rule
In the northern part of Yemen, the Constituent People's Assembly, on July 17, 1978, elected Major Ali Abdullah Saleh, by a majority of votes, as the President of the Yemen Arab Republic and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and appointed Judge Abdul Karim Abdullah Al-Arashi as the Vice President of the Republic.
In less than three months after he assumed the presidency of the country, on October 15, 1978, military and civilian members of the Nasserist organization led an attempted coup, which Saleh was able to successfully thwart, leading subsequently to the trial and execution of dozens of Nasseriste leaders. On October 27, 1978, eight of the military leaders of the coup were executed, namely: Mohsen Ahmed Fallah, Abdullah Saleh Al-Razqi, Mohammed Mabkhout Al-Flehi, Abdulwasea Al-Ash'ari, Mahyoub Ali Al-Arfi, Qasim Mansour Isma'il Al-Shaibani, Abdulaziz Mohammed Rassam, and Hussein Abdullah. Additionally, later, on November 5, 1978, twelve civilian leaders were executed, including Issa Mohammed Saif, the Secretary-General of the Nasserist organization, Salem Mohammed Al-Saqaf, the Assistant Secretary-General, who also served as the Deputy Director of the Presidential Office, and others holding prominent positions such as: Mohammed Ahmed Ibrahim Nasr - Member of the Executive Leadership, Abdulsalam Mohammed Muqbil - Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, and Ahmed Saif- Member of the Executive Leadership, Mohammed Mohsen Saeed Al-Hajjaji, Abdulkareem Nasser Al-Mahwiti, Ali Mohammed Abbad Al-Sanabani, Nasser Mohammed Al-Yafei, Manea Yahya Saeed Al-Tam, Hussein Abdulbari Ahmed Madhaji, and Ali Saleh Hussein Naji Radfani.
Following the failure of the coup, thousands of members of the Nasserist organization fled to the southern regions of Yemen, where they found support in resisting the authority in the north. This contributed to bridging perspectives between the Nasserist organization and other opposition forces. Some members of the Nasserist organization aligned themselves with the National Democratic Front, which led various leftist and nationalist forces in the country. Their common goal was to establish a democratic national authority in the northern part of Yemen, with a focus on achieving democratic unity. Their armed operations were concentrated in areas between Damt, Al-Bayda, and Harib, in the Wadi Bana areas, and in the Hujariya region, south of Taiz Governorate, as well as in the areas of Utuma, Raymah, and Wesab, and they gained control over vast areas. The military campaigns of Saleh's regime failed to eliminate or halt the advance of these operations in large parts of the central areas of Yemen. These areas marked the initial stages of the alliance between Saleh's regime and the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Yemen, forming the Islamic Front. In an effort to intensify pressure on Saleh's regime, the southern Yemeni forces initiated a large-scale military operation on February 23, 1979, in front of which the defense lines of the north Yemeni forces collapsed, and the southern forces reached Al-Bayda governorate before the war was brought to a halt through Kuwaiti mediation. This mediation involved hosting a summit between the presidents of the two parts, Abdulfattah Ismail and Ali Saleh, in Kuwait.
As for the other part of Yemen, the south, Abdulfattah Ismail assumed the presidency of South Yemen, succeeding President Salimeen, and was elected Secretary-General of the Yemeni Socialist Party in October 1978. He resigned from all positions in April 1980 due to health reasons. Afterward, he left for Moscow, handing over the presidency to Ali Nasser Mohammed. In the sixth year of his presidency, the struggle for power reached its climax when Aden, the capital of South Yemen, witnessed on January 13, 1986, bloody events that occurred after violent clashes broke out between the formations and forces of two wings of the ruling Socialist Party, the (Al-Tughma) faction, loyal to former President Abdel Fattah Ismail, and the (Al-Zumra) faction, under the leadership of President Ali Nasser Mohammed. On the first day of the eleven-day confrontations, about 3,800 people were killed, including prominent leaders from the first ranks of the party and the state, resulting in thousands of injuries. In addition, the conflict led to the exodus of many leadership cadres and military, political, and administrative figures. These bloody confrontations ended with the defeat of the faction of President Ali Nasser Mohammed, and his forces retreated to North Yemen. Then, the engineer Haider Abu Bakr Al-Attas succeeded him as the president of South Yemen in the period of the rule of the "Al-Tughma" era (1986–1990), during which Ali Salem Al-Baidh was the Secretary-General of the party and one of its key leaders. The events of January marked a crucial turning point in the history of South Yemen, casting shadows over subsequent events in Yemen and the region.
Southerners in Sanaa.. Northerners in Aden
One striking paradox when reviewing and scrutinizing the facts and events of Yemeni history since the mid-eighteenth century until today is the state of overlap, symmetry, and intertwining between the south and north of Yemen throughout various transformations. It is difficult to find an event or transformation in Sanaa that has no connection to Aden, and vice versa. Notably, personalities from the South often take the forefront or roles in Sanaa, while individuals from the North play a central role in Aden. Aden, for instance, hosted historical leaders of the Free Yemeni Party (Al-Noman, Al-Zubairi, and Al-Fadhool), along with numerous political and union activists. Similarly, Taiz hosted Abdullah Badheeb and his newspaper, Al-Tali'a, in the late 1950s. In the 1960s, it also welcomed figures like Salemeen, Faisal Al-Shaabi, Abdulfattah Ismail, Mohsen Al-Sharjabi, and Moqbel. Just as it accommodated their adversaries, such as Mohammed Salem Basindowah, Abdullah Al-Asnaj, Hussein Ashaal, and Abdulqawi Makaawi, at different times.
"The Republic of Yemen was declared on May 22, 1990, through the integration of political, military, security, administrative, judicial, and legislative structures, based on substantial inputs from the legacy of cycles of political conflict."
The Third Phase:
From 1990 to 2010
Declaration of the Establishment of the Republic of Yemen
After rounds of negotiations spanning three decades and based on the historic Aden Agreement signed on November 30, 1989, as well as the Unity Agreement between South and North Yemen signed on April 22, 1990, the Republic of Yemen was declared on May 22, 1990. The political, military, security, administrative, judicial, and legislative structures were integrated, influenced by the substantial legacy of political conflicts over almost four decades, along with the effects of various regional, international, and local transformations. Additionally, the newly formed nascent state of Yemen introduced fresh perspectives and new dimensions to the "dissimilarity problem" following the establishment of the September and October republics. In a region surrounded by kingdoms, emirates, and sultanates, the unified Yemen recently proclaimed its entry into the club of emerging democracies. Its new constitution encompasses principles such as democracy, political pluralism, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful transition, elections, and freedom for civil society, in a region that classifies these contents as major prohibitions and existential threats.
The agreement between the leadership of the two ruling parties in both regions—the Yemeni Socialist Party and the General People's Congress—announced the establishment of a complete integrative unity in which the international legal personalities of each party dissolved into a single international legal entity called the Republic of Yemen. Interestingly, the "Unity Declaration Agreement" lacked any reference to the status of the army, either before or after the declaration of unity. This omission was notable given the significance of the armed forces in the establishment and sustainability of any state. Similarly, the first Constitution of the Unity State was limited to articles related to the armed forces. It included brief, loose, and fleeting references, falling short of providing even the minimum guidelines, determinants, and assurances for the development of the armed forces. Instead, it relied on references to the law, the National Defense Council, and the Presidential Council, creating serious gaps that influenced many subsequent events and setbacks.
During the transitional phase, southern military brigades were relocated to the north and northern brigades to the south. This process unfolded in a consensual manner, lacking a clear and deliberate integration plan in line with contemporary military principles. All military formations retained their established structures, connections, doctrines, and loyalties to both regional and party affiliations that predated the formation of the unified state and its institutions. This was one of the factors that later exacerbated many of the problems that engulfed the transitional period, including assassinations, terrorist operations, crises among military formations, disputes over armament, appointments, interference in duties and powers, and non-compliance with the constitution, laws, and prevailing systems. Furthermore, the leadership of the unified state committed numerous serious mistakes and transgressions, collectively resulting in a deterioration of the security, economic, and political situations and landscape. This, coupled with significant imbalances and gaps in the governance of the unified state system, plunged Yemen into a stormy political crisis within less than three years of the establishment of unity.
“Evasions of the commitments outlined in the "Document of Covenant and Agreement," signed by ruling partners and other political forces, exacerbated imbalances and rifts, igniting the sparks of the summer '94 war.”
Amidst that crisis, the majority of political forces in the arena engaged in profound dialogues to salvage the unity of the state. Through what became known as the "Document of Covenant and Agreement," they addressed numerous unprecedented legislative, structural, and operational imbalances and distortions with a considerable level of detail, clarity, and transparency. Significantly, a substantial portion of these discussions was devoted to the challenges specific to the military institution, along with various other issues. The document outlined a practical and long-term approach to addressing these challenges, providing a precise roadmap for overcoming the crisis and ensuring the progression towards the establishment of a stable modern Yemeni state.
However, the evasion of commitments outlined in the "Document of Covenant and Agreement," signed by ruling partners and other political forces, deepened imbalances and fractures and ignited the spark of the 1994 summer war, which began as armed clashes between several brigades in Amran and Dhamar on April 27, 1994, and then extended on a large scale. Saleh led, under the banner of maintaining unity, a wide coalition of regular armed formations, groups of the Islah Party and tribes, and groups of jihadists returning from Afghanistan, in addition to southern formations of the faction (Al-Zumara), who fled to the north following the events of January 13, 1986, in Aden and the south, in the face of formations led by his deputy Ali Salem Al-Beidh, under the banner of disengagement and the reclaim of the state of the south, and ended with the invasion of Saleh's forces and his coalition into the southern governorates on July 7, 1994.
Despite the cessation of military operations and the defeat of the Socialist Party forces in the south, Saleh and his victorious allies continued to seize state institutions and properties, including acquiring lands and real estate. Additionally, there were widespread layoffs affecting personnel in military, security, and civilian institutions in the south affiliated with the party. The aftermath of this war, accompanied by acts of liquidation and displacement that reached the point of elimination, has had significant effects on politics, economy, and society in Yemen. Saleh's regime repeatedly rejected calls to address the repercussions of that war, leaving its files open, interacting, worsening, expanding, and deepening its circle, becoming increasingly complex until today.
So, instead of taking responsible initiatives to address the numerous repercussions of that war, the coalition of victorious parties in the war and the power centers of the ruling wings engage in a chaotic race to harvest spoils, invoices, and entitlements of that war's legacy from the defeated party. Saleh, year after year, leans towards sidelining war and governance allies, seeking to monopolize power. A prominent aspect of this shift is the elimination of influential military commanders, such as Brigadier General Ahmed Faraj, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Planning and Armaments Affairs; Brigadier General Mohammed Ismael Al-Qadi, Commander of the Eastern Military Region; and Brigadier General Ahmed Hussein Saleh Al-Aqeeli, Director of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, along with 15 other officers, all killed in a military plane crash on August 14, 1999, in Hadhramout. This is concurrent with the removal of significant figures like General Yahya Al-Mutawakel, Mujahid Abu Shawarib, and Abdulilah Al-Qadi. Additionally, there was a reduction in the partnership with the Islah Party, terminating many privileges associated with this party and leading to its expulsion from power circles. One of the notable aspects of this trajectory is the decision to abolish the scientific institutes, a parallel government educational system funded by the government that had been pledged to the party, its ideology, and its absolute dominance for decades. Furthermore, Saleh and his ruling party's determination aimed to secure a comfortable majority of parliamentary seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections, the 1999 presidential elections, and the 2003 parliamentary elections, while reducing the share of the Islah party and other parties to no more than 15% of the composition of the House of Representatives.
“Saleh and his party monopolized power, disabled opposition mechanisms, and confined their interactions to the sidelines, after he succeeded in limiting the role of the House of Representatives to decorative and promotional frameworks.”
Having secured a comfortable majority in parliament, Saleh and his party were able to form a complete coalition government without the need to align with the Islah Party and without concerns about its reservations, either individually or in conjunction with other opposition parties such as the Socialist Party, which focused on recovering from the effects of the 1994 war. Saleh and his party monopolized power, disabled opposition mechanisms, and confined their interactions to the sidelines. After he succeeded in limiting the role of the House of Representatives to decorative and promotional frameworks and emptying it of any effective oversight role, he passed many legislation, agreements, and policies, such as the border demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia, economic reform programs, and agreements related to gas and oil.
In parallel, Saleh initiated a new level of the hereditary project by empowering several members of his family to lead the military and security apparatuses. A prominent aspect of this path lies in efforts to strengthen the military influence of his son, Brigadier General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, the commander of the Republican Guard and Special Forces, and his other son, Salah Ali Abdullah Saleh, the commander of the Mountain Infantry Forces. This also includes his nephew, Brigadier General Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, the chief of staff of the Central Security Forces, and his brother, Ammar Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, the deputy head of the National Security Agency, along with their brother, Brigadier General Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, the commander of the Presidential Protection Brigades, and Mohammed Saleh Al-Ahmar, the commander of the Air Force, at the expense of the influence of Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the commander of the Northwestern Region and the First Armored Division. This led to unprecedented cracks in the regime's structure, deepening during the second half of the first decade of the 21st century, particularly on the sidelines of the Saada wars, contrary to the longstanding alliance that prevailed for decades before the establishment of the unity and subsequent to its declaration.
During the second decade of the Yemeni Unity era, spanning the first ten years of the third millennium, the Yemeni landscape witnessed a series of closely related transformations regarding the status of the Yemeni military institution, the condition of the Yemeni state, and its other institutions, the most prominent of which are:
- Yemen's Participation in Counter-Terrorism Efforts
Following the events of September 11, 2001, and the attack on the American destroyer Cole in the Gulf of Aden, Saleh's regime brought Yemen into the realm of counter-terrorism operations. This encompassed pursuits, arrests, and trials targeting individuals accused of affiliation with Al-Qaeda in various Yemeni regions. Then the efforts extended to drone operations under the open skies policy, initiated by targeting "Abu Ali Al-Harithi" in Marib in 2002 and continuing for two decades. Overall, these actions revealed significant gaps in the Yemeni military's status and capabilities, as well as critical deficiencies in other state institutions.
On February 6, 2003, the formation of the Joint Meeting Parties Bloc was announced as a framework for the alliance of major opposition parties in Yemen. At its forefront were the Islah Party, the Socialist Party, the Nasserite Organization, and other smaller parties. This marked the first serious and influential political opposition to Saleh's rule in Yemen's history. The Joint Meeting Parties Bloc adopted an opposition political discourse with a high ceiling and unprecedented political momentum.
On April 27, 2003, parliamentary elections were conducted, resulting in a victory for the General People's Congress, the party affiliated with the President, securing a majority in the parliament with 229 out of 301 seats, representing 76% of the total. The Islah Party won 45 seats, for a percentage of 14.95% of the seats. The remaining seats were distributed among other parties and independents. President Saleh's and his party's political tendencies are evident, given the results of the parliamentary elections in 1997, in which the Congress Party won 223 seats and the Islah Party won 64 seats, and the results of the parliamentary elections in 1993, which resulted in the victory of the General People’s Congress Party with 134 seats, followed by the Yemeni Socialist Party with 68 seats, the Islah Party with 64 seats, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party with 7 seats, and the Al-Haq Party with 2 seats, along with one candidate each for the Nasserist Popular Unionist Organization and the Nasserite Correction Organization, as well as the Nasserite Democratic Party.
“The Saada Wars began on a limited scale in a small, remote village in the northern Saada province, then escalated over six bloody rounds, characterized by randomness, manipulation, exploitation, poor management, and lawlessness.”
The Six Saada Wars
On June 19, 2004, the first round of the Saada War erupted in northern Yemen between the Houthi group and the army forces. It initially started in a small, remote village north of Saada province and later expanded over six bloody rounds characterized by randomness, manipulation, mismanagement, and lawlessness. With appalling violations during this war, it became a turning point, revealing the dismal state of the Yemeni armed forces and the overall institutions of the state. Additionally, the Saada Wars marked one of the major stages of haphazard recruitment of tribal individuals on a large scale. The interpretation of these wars and their repeated failures is seen as an engineered trap to exhaust the forces of the northwest region and the First Armored Division led by General Ali Mohsen. This interpretation was further supported by WikiLeaks documents revealing that intelligence agencies loyal to Saleh provided coordinates of Ali Mohsen's location during his command of military operations in Saada to the Saudi air force, targeting him as a Houthi group location. This incident served as the breaking point and the straw that broke the back of the close historical alliance.
The Presidential Elections in 2006
On September 20, 2006, Yemen witnessed its first competitive presidential elections between President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the candidate of the ruling party, and Engineer Faisal bin Shamlan, the candidate of the Joint Meeting Parties opposition coalition, in which Saleh won a new presidential term. Despite the significant challenges and irregularities in the electoral registry and the heightened mobilization by Saleh and the ruling party, Bin Shamlan garnered 22% of the votes, as indicated by official data. However, Faisal bin Shamlan did not acknowledge these results, claiming victory based on unofficial reports.
"The 'Hilal Ba Sorra' report monitored numerous violations by Saleh and his regime, calling for holding those responsible for the breaches in the south accountable and warning of the potential loss of the entire south.”
Southern Movement Protests
Following the opposition's popular movement against the Saleh regime, which coincided with the 2006 presidential elections, protest demonstrations were launched on January 13, 2007 (known as the Day of Reconciliation and Tolerance) led by those dismissed from military, security, and civilian jobs that followed the summer war of 1994. With Saleh's regime not responding to its demands and confronting them with repression, including the use of live ammunition against protesters, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, unjust trials, and violations of journalistic freedoms, the "Southern Movement" escalated its demands and began in 2008, demanding the separation of southern Yemen from the north. In 2009, a presidential committee was formed to address the problem, and it issued its report, the well-known Ba Sorra Report. This report documented numerous transgressions by Saleh and his regime, called for holding those responsible for violations in the south accountable, and warned of the potential loss of the entire south region.
Political Deadlock
Since 2005, Yemen has joined the list of fragile states. After rounds of dialogue between opposition political parties and Saleh's ruling party, an agreement was reached to postpone parliamentary elections. This later brought Yemen, by the year 2010, to a state of political deadlock, with the exacerbation of many political, economic, security, and military crises.
On November 23, 2011, under Saudi sponsorship in Riyadh, the Yemeni parties signed the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism as a framework for a political settlement, addressing the political deadlock and the complex situation exacerbated by the popular uprising in 2011.
The Fourth Phase: From 2011 to 2023
Squandered Transformation Opportunities
The Arab Spring in Yemen
In February 2011, Yemen witnessed the eruption of protests and demonstrations, echoing the broader Arab Spring movement, demanding the ousting of the Saleh regime. Notably, opposition parties, spearheaded by the Joint Meeting Parties, actively engaged in this call for change. As repression and violations by Saleh's forces escalated to counter the popular protests, Brigadier General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar announced on March 21, 2011, that he and his forces had defected from the regime and joined the revolution demanding the overthrow of the regime. Subsequently, many other forces and tribal and military leaders declared their support for the revolution, leading to armed conflicts in various areas, including Sanaa (specifically in Al-Hasaba, Arhab, and downtown Sanaa) and in the city of Taiz, central Yemen. During this period, the Ansar al-Sharia group seized control of Zinjibar and Jaar in Abyan province, which were later liberated by Yemeni army forces in a military operation. Following this success, Abyan province was handed over to the Popular Committees led by Abdulatif Al-Sayed. Additionally, the Houthi group took control of the capital of Saada province, engaging in a bloody conflict with armed formations affiliated with the Islah Party to control al-Jawf. Amidst escalating acts of violence on a large scale, an explosion blast occurred in the mosque of the presidential palace in June 2011, targeting President Saleh and several top leaders. President Saleh was seriously injured, and a number of senior political and military leaders were killed and wounded along with him. Saleh was subsequently transferred to a hospital in Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. During this period of recuperation, Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi assumed the presidential responsibilities.
Gulf Initiative and its Executive Mechanism
The Transitional Phase and its Challenges
Amidst the deepening political crisis, on November 23, 2011, Yemeni parties, under the auspices of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, signed the Gulf Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism at the Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh. This initiative served as a framework for a political settlement, addressing the political deadlock and the complex situation exacerbated by the 2011 popular uprising against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, within the context of the Arab Spring revolutions. The initiative aimed, according to its final text, to preserve Yemen's unity, security, and stability, meet the aspirations of the Yemeni people for change and reform, and ensure a smooth and secure transfer of power, avoiding Yemen's descent into chaos and violence, all under the umbrella of national consensus.
Despite substantial reservations regarding certain provisions of the Gulf Initiative, such as the immunity law, many significant steps were taken throughout the first year of the transitional phase. This period witnessed the formation of the National Unity Government, and on February 21, 2012, a presidential election with a single candidate, Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi—agreed upon by the parties signatory to the initiative—took place. Hadi assumed the role of consensus president, succeeding Saleh, for a transitional period until February 21, 2014. Additionally, the formation of the Supreme Military Committee, which played a crucial role in ending areas of armed conflict, reopening routes, dismantling barricades and military barracks, and normalizing conditions in the capital, Sanaa, and other provinces.
As a matter of fact, the Islah Party, with its various wings, largely dominated most paths in the first year of the transitional period. This coincided with escalating differences between President Hadi and his predecessor Saleh. Additionally, with branches of the Muslim Brotherhood reaching power in several Arab countries, the party emerged bolstered, reflecting its role in the revolution against Saleh. This contrasted with the contributions and weights of the other forces. The party drew on its significant governance experience from the backseat during its previous alliances with Saleh. That year was marked by a state of chaotic consolidation, including appointments to military, security, and civilian positions. This also extended to the appointment of governors in Al-Jawf, Amran, Hajjah, and Marib. These actions stirred a lot of concerns, grievances, and reservations among its allies in the Joint Meeting Parties coalition and in the revolution, in addition to indignation from Saleh and those remaining in his camp in the final phase of his journey.
In alliance with the Islah Party and other parties and forces, President Hadi initiated a process of trimming the claws, which affected several members of his predecessor Saleh's family. He gradually dismissed Mohammed Saleh Al-Ahmar, Yahya Saleh, Tariq Saleh, Ammar Saleh, culminating in the dismissal of Ahmed Ali.
With the beginning of the second year of Hadi's presidency, Yemen witnessed a series of perilous events. These included targeting the air force through bombings, assassinations, and incidents involving the crashing of several military aircraft. There were also assassinations targeting political security officers, military leadership, along with a wave of political assassinations, and terrorist attacks such as the attack on the Ministry of Defense complex.
“The military seminar did not diagnose the reality of the military institution or address any of its challenges. The restructuring operations aimed to demolishing the phases, pushing towards a mandatory direction ultimately leading to extending Hadi's presidency.”
Extension Efforts: Ambition Without Competence in Action
While President Hadi took the lead in steering the transitional phase, relying heavily on his Defense Minister, Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, and the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, who was wielding the stick of the Security Council and its sanctions, along with a small circle of technicians attached to his office, he effectively froze the actions of the Supreme Military Committee. He then worked to make the National Dialogue Conference a formal gathering with predetermined outcomes, culminating in an absurd process that ensured the dismantling and undermining of the army under the guise of restructuring the armed forces. Notable sponsors of this process included the American and British ambassadors. In reality, it was nothing more than a superficial and formal maneuvering of the military's structure, based on theoretical concepts discussed within the framework of what was known as the military seminar. This seminar failed to diagnose the reality of the military institution or address any of its challenges. The restructuring operations aimed to burn down and demolish the stages, pushing towards a mandatory direction ultimately leading to extending Hadi's presidency, contrary to the agreement signed between political parties. Hadi and his associates presented a vivid example of what ambition without competence, vision, or a plan can do.
Gulf Initiative Faces Setback: Unsuccessful Outcomes
Subversive Traps and War Gateways
Given the utmost importance of the transitional phase, a pronounced leadership void unfolded, marked by concurrent weaknesses in both the presidency and the government to an unprecedented degree. This vacuum provided a fertile ground for the Minister of Defense, Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, to assume significant roles. These became particularly evident in the aftermath of the ousting of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the subsequent fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt in July 2013, aided by the UAE and Gulf allies. Yemen was forcibly and unexpectedly pushed onto a completely different path, carefully engineered to achieve a series of geopolitical objectives. These objectives can now be read by assembling parts of the scene, its events, and its outcomes after more than ten years, which can be traced and analyzed to draw coherent conclusions about the planned operations that ensured the failure of the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism. This initiative, representing a proactive Saudi political approach, aimed to safeguard Yemen from sliding into the pitfalls of escalation.
The Current Conflict
The Current War and Its Local, Regional, and International Implications
In the midst of international and regional complacency, coupled with a concerted plan to fill the voids within Yemen, at a time when many forces have been shackled by the Security Council’s sanctions under the title of holding accountable those obstructing the political process, with the political elites struggling and distracted by quotas, scheming, and desires for revenge, the Houthi group has undergone a transformation from a small faction in the northern regions of Yemen into an armed formation. All obstacles hindering the group's progress have been dismantled since its first steps outside its stronghold in the mountains of Saada, through a series of wars in the north, starting with the Damaj, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, and Amran wars. This includes President Hadi's famous statement following the death of Brigade 310's commander, Hameed Al-Qushaibi, and the Houthi group's control over Amran during his visit to Amran, when he declared that Amran had returned to the state's embrace, culminating in the seizure of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, and the remaining provinces by armed force on September 21, 2014. This occurred amidst collusion from Hadi and his Defense Minister, facilitated by Saleh and his allies among the tribal leaders encircling Sanaa, military commanders, security apparatus, and the commitment of the Islah Party, constrained and targeted since post-June 2013. Meanwhile, the highest levels of self-restraint were observed as left-wing elites fell under the delusion that the Houthi group's operation only targeted power centers, the Al-Ahmar House, the First Armored Division, and the Iman University (an Islamic university affiliated one of Islah leaders). Further, many media outlets and elites pledged their allegiance to the Houthi group's propaganda mission, drowning the public scene in ambiguity amid regional and international collusion. This collusion was then interpreted as one of the side concessions of the U.S.-Iranian understandings, in line with the nuclear agreement. Western satisfaction with the Houthi group's ability to counter Sunni terrorism was noted, given the failures of weak and dilapidated government structures.
Then, under the muzzles of the Houthi group's rifles, the parties signed the Peace and Partnership Agreement, marking the group's control over the capital Sanaa on September 21, 2014. This led to the formation of the government of Engineer Khaled Bahah. However, the honeymoon between President Hadi and the Houthi group was short-lived. As fierce clashes erupted between the Presidential Guard and Houthi militants, resulting in the former's defeat. This prompted the Prime Minister to resign on January 22, 2015, protesting the Houthi group's obstruction of government affairs. Shortly after, President Hadi resigned as well, placed under house arrest by the Houthi group along with the government ministers. On February 15, the UN Security Council placed Yemen under Chapter VII according to Resolution 2201. A few days later, President Hadi managed to elude Houthi militants, escaping from Sanaa on February 21, 2015, and reaching the city of Aden in the south.
Yemen, with the influence of Iran and its activities,
and the task of exporting destruction.
With the Houthi group seizing control of the capital Sanaa through the force of arms, Iran secured a significant stake in the inheritance of the "ailing man" in Yemen. This falls within the framework of Iran's notable pursuit of exporting the revolution since 1979. From a national security perspective, especially for Iran, Yemen is added to the list alongside Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran's contributions to these societies through its allies and proxies consist of a blend of firepower, ideological lethality, and propagated slogans. For Iran, these countries are no more than maneuvering spaces, utilizing coercive means. It has rendered the societies of those nations weaker and poorer at all levels and in all considerations. Iran's actions mirror those of other countries whose foreign policies are rooted in their historical colonial legacy, such as Britain, the United States, and France, and their regional players like Israel and the United Arab Emirates, which play roles, intervene, and contribute to this dynamic, inevitably leading to the weakening of nations and societies classified, unfortunately, as allies and friends in the Middle East and Africa.
In a television interview with the Russia Today channel, broadcasted in early May 2023, Jamal Benomar, the UN envoy to Yemen at the time, revealed that one of the reasons for the outbreak of the war lies in the refusal of Yemeni political forces to agree to a proposal allocating a maritime port for the Azal region within the framework of the federal regions, a proposal presented as one of the outcomes of the National Dialogue. However, this emphasized the danger of what he disclosed, as it explained many artificially orchestrated events leading to the escalation and war, confirming they were not natural developments. According to Benomar, the undisclosed discussions during 2013, when the Houthis were still a small force in Saada, included promises designating Azal as a state for the group. The publicly presented perspective, portrayed as an outcome of the dialogue, was, in reality, imposed as a calculated and engineered inputs to shape subsequent events. Additionally, the interview shed light on facts explaining numerous roles, events, and developments during the years 2012–2014 that remained puzzling despite their seriousness and magnitude.
With the announcement of the arrival of President Hadi to the city of Aden, Houthi forces headed south, consuming provinces one after another without resistance. On their way to Aden, near the Al Anad base, a small group of Houthi fighters coincidentally captured the Defense Minister of Hadi's government, Major General Mahmoud al-Subaihi, the prominent military commander, Major General Faisal Rajab, and President Hadi's brother, the head of the Political Security Apparatus in Aden, Major General Nasser Mansour. This military operation led to clashes in the streets and neighborhoods of the city between Houthi forces and Saleh's forces on one side, and disunited, untrained armed groups on the other. The defeat of those groups resulted in President Hadi fleeing across the border to Oman and declaring his arrival in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on March 25, 2015, marking the beginning of Saudi Arabia and its allies' extensive military operations known as Operation Decisive Storm.
On April 14, 2015, the United Nations Security Council announced the inclusion of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, the son of the former president and former commander of the Republican Guard Forces, on the sanctions list. He was accused of undermining President Hadi's authority, thwarting Hadi's attempts to reform the army, obstructing Yemen's peaceful transition to democracy, and facilitating the military expansion of the Houthi forces. This decision followed the previous inclusion of his father, the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, on November 7, 2014, along with leaders of the Houthi group, on the same charges.
"The coalition's operations, from the very first day, were practically achieving objectives entirely different from its declared objectives and contradicting them. These operations have pushed Yemen to a new level of conflict, with bloodshed, and supported the formation of militias against the internationally recognized government forces."
While the Houthi and Saleh forces were on the verge of taking control of the entire city of Taiz and its outskirts, coinciding with their advance towards Aden in March 2015, peaceful protests opposing the group's control over Taiz and Aden erupted on Tuesday, March 24, 2015. At the time, armed individuals from the Houthi gunmen (Ansar Allah) and special security forces attacked two separate peaceful demonstrations. They opened fire on a peaceful gathering in Al-Qasr roundabout, northeast of Taiz, and in a separate attack, they fired on a peaceful protest in the city of Al-Turba (southwest of Taiz). Since that bloody day, Taiz entered into a destructive conflict, leading to the death of thousands of civilians and the injury of thousands more.
As the conflict in Taiz focused on gaining control of the city, various armed groups formed in opposition to the Houthi group and Saleh forces. The most prominent among them were those loyal to the Islah Party, led by Hamoud Al-Mekhlafi. Additionally, regular soldiers affiliated with Brigade 35, led by Colonel Adnan Al-Hamadi, and Salafist groups under the leadership of Abu al-Abbas were part of the resistance. During the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, Taiz witnessed some of the fiercest confrontations, with dozens of deadly attacks targeting civilians. The Houthi group, along with Saleh's forces, imposed a suffocating siege on Taiz. The opposition forces managed to break the siege from the western side, gaining control over most of Taiz, extending to Al-Hujariya in the west. However, the Houthis persisted in retaining control over parts of the east, north, and south of the city.
On the early morning of March 26, 2015, just one day after President Hadi's arrival in Aden, Saudi Arabia, led by the newly appointed Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman, announced the command of a military operation by a coalition of nine Arab countries. The goal was to end the Houthi rebellion and restore President Hadi to power. However, from the very first day, the coalition's operations were practically achieving objectives entirely contrary to its declared objectives and contradicting them. These operations have pushed Yemen to a new level of conflict, with bloodshed, and supported the formation of militias against the internationally recognized government forces.
On July 14, 2015, the Saudi and Emirati-led coalition, along with southern resistance forces, announced a military operation involving naval, aerial, and ground forces to liberate the city of Aden from the control of Houthi forces and their ally at the time, former President Saleh. This was followed by a military operation to liberate the Bab al-Mandab strait and the district of Thubab on October 1, 2015. These areas were taken from the grip of the Houthis and became under the control of Yemeni forces aligned with the Saudi and Emirati-led coalition. On January 23, 2017, Yemeni army forces and southern resistance, with support from the coalition, declared the complete liberation of the city of Mocha, possessing the strategic port on the Red Sea west of Taiz province. This victory was achieved after intense battles described as "fierce," marking the end of Houthi and former President Saleh's forces' control over the city. Meanwhile, with the UAE focusing on supporting Salafist groups, extremist jihadist formations infiltrated Aden, seizing neighborhoods such as Al-Tawahi, Mina Al-Zeit, and others.
Prior to engaging in the war with the Houthis, and even before some of its consequences unfolded, UAE forces turned their attention to bloody eradication operations targeting the presence of the Islah party in Aden. These operations, involving assassinations and liquidations, targeted hundreds of political, social, and religious figures in Aden. They were carried out by the United Arab Emirates through the American company "Spear Operations Group," which includes former commando soldiers from the U.S. Navy SEALs, elite fighters of the American Special Operations Forces who underwent specialized training by the U.S. military. According to the "BuzzFeed News" website, the company "Spear Operations Group," which hired the soldiers and carried out the assassination operations, was founded in Delaware State by Abraham Golan, a Hungarian security contractor. The deal that brought American mercenaries to the streets of Aden was reportedly made during a lunch meal at the Officers' Club inside a UAE military base in Abu Dhabi.
While the UAE claimed that its operations against branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were part of its opposition to Islamic extremists, paradoxically, the UAE itself trained, armed, and funded Salafi groups in Yemen. The most prominent among them were the "Abu al-Abbas" group in Taiz, listed on the U.S. terrorism list. Additionally, there were also armed formations led by Hani bin Brik, Al-Mahrami, Al-Mihdhar, Hamdi Shukri, Abdullatif Al-Sayyid, and a long list of other militant Salafi groups in Aden and other southern provinces. Ironically, the UAE forces were protecting the formations of the Islah party with a formidable defense of Patriot missile batteries in Marib.
Since the early days of the coalition's war in Yemen, friendly fire from the coalition's fighter jets led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been responsible for eliminating professional military leaders from the internationally recognized government forces, such as Al-Abara. Meanwhile, prominent military leaders like Al-Shaddadi, Al-Hamadi, Al-Jaradi, Shalan, and others were killed under mysterious circumstances.
Before the city of Taiz could embark on a path to recovery from the initial round of conflict, it found itself immersed in a new cycle, with the goal of control between the "Abu Al-Abas" armed formations, supported by the UAE on one side, and the armed formations affiliated with the Islah Party on the other. Amidst this conflict, extremist jihadist formations infiltrated the heart of the city of Taiz, concentrating their control on the Old City and the neighborhoods of Souq Al-Sameel and Al-Jumhuri, as well as other neighborhoods to the east and south of the city. On April 21, 2018, On April 21, 2018, it was announced that Hanna Lahoud, an employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was killed in Taiz by extremists. Throughout the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, the coalition's support, particularly from the UAE, specifically focused on strengthening and empowering the Salafist "Abu Al-Abas" formations at the expense of the Islah Party formations led by "Hammoud Al-Mekhlafi," which had been targeted for the forced weakening amid an escalating path of subjugation by the coalition's dominance in one of the party's key strongholds.
"In late 2017, tensions escalated between the two allies of power in the Yemeni capital Sanaa: former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his party, and the Houthi group. Their close alliance came to an end with the killing of Saleh."
The process of weakening and marginalizing the formations of the Islah Party, which was ongoing and effective, only came to a halt with the announcement of the U.S. administration's designation of Adel Abdu Farea "Abu Al-Abbas" on October 25, 2017, on the U.S. terrorist lists. Subsequently, he was also listed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This created an exceptional opportunity for the Islah Party formations, which were ready to seize the moment, to reclaim their absolute control and influence over the city of Taiz under the banner of counterterrorism. After regaining absolute control over the city, the Islah formations turned their backs on the Houthi forces entrenched east of the city and moved west to take control of the Al-Turba and Al-Hujariya areas (southwest of Taiz).
In late 2017, tensions escalated between the allies of power in the Yemeni capital Sana'a: former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his party, and the Houthi group. Their close alliance came to an end, leading to intense armed confrontations in several neighborhoods near Saleh's residence in central Sana'a. The clashes concluded on December 2, 2017, just a few days after they began, with the announcement of Saleh's death, along with several leaders from his party, and the escape of his nephew, Brigadier Tariq Saleh.
In mid-February 2018, the first appearance of Brigadier Tariq Saleh was documented in the city of Al-Mokha. Tariq had previously assumed command of the Special Guard Forces and the Third Presidential Guard Brigade during the latter years of his uncle Saleh's rule. Subsequently, he announced the establishment of new armed formations under his command, named the National Resistance/Guards of the Republic, with support from the United Arab Emirates. This enabled these forces to seize control of the strategic city of Al-Mokha and its port, introducing a new player in the ongoing war. Later on, these formations, along with other military forces collectively known as the Joint Forces, were engaged in a large-scale military operation launched on April 19, 2018. The objective was to take control of the Khaled bin Al-Waleed Camp east of Al-Mokha, and to gain control of a crucial intersection road between the coastal city of Al-Mokha and Taiz, and contribute to the subsequent advance towards the northern city of Al-Hodeidah. This military operation was named "The Golden Victory" and took place in June 2018.
Amidst the Saudi-Emirati competition for influence and control, and in conjunction with a large-scale escalation in the fronts of Ma'rib and Shabwah, the formations led by Tariq Saleh, known as the Guards of the Republic/the National Resistance, and supported by the UAE, announced on Thursday, November 11, 2021, a unilateral and surprising withdrawal operation from their advanced positions south of the city of Al-Hodeidah, covering an area of about 100 kilometers on the west coast. The withdrawal operation had no connection to the Stockholm Agreement and took place without the knowledge of the United Nations or any of its offices and agencies. Additionally, it also occurred without the knowledge of the internationally recognized government or any of its appointed local authorities. The withdrawal was not coordinated with other local armed formations loyal to the internationally recognized government, and the coordination was limited to a narrow scope between the Joint Forces and the Transitional Council, supported by the UAE. Meanwhile, the Houthis deployed military reinforcements, two days before the withdrawal, to fill the vacuum, taking control of all the areas from which the withdrawal took place without a fight.
In 2019, the UAE's Foreign Minister, Anwar Gargash, stated that his country armed and trained 90,000 fighters in southern Yemen within non-regular formations, including the Security Belts and elite military formations affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council. Additionally, there were Salafist formations under the Giants Brigades led by Abdulrahman Al-Mahrami, as well as formations led by Tariq Saleh on the West Coast and defensive units in Shabwa. In parallel, Saudi Arabia supported Islah Party formations in Marib, Taiz, and Sayoun, along with internationally recognized government forces.
In late August 2019, intense clashes erupted in the city of Aden between military and security forces aligned with the internationally recognized government, backed by Saudi Arabia, on one side, and formations and forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, backed by the UAE, on the other. The confrontations concluded with the Southern Transitional Council forces gaining control over the entire city of Aden, leading to the symbolic and limited presence of the internationally recognized government dissipating, which had previously declared Aden a temporary capital for the country.
“The UAE engaged in a series of covert operations to impose a new reality based on its perspective, driven by concerns that any stability in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the region would undermine its interests. Thus, it planted numerous mines through fueling regional and local tendencies.”
On August 29, 2019, Emirati fighter jets attacked military formations affiliated with the internationally recognized Yemeni government forces in Aden and Abyan, resulting in hundreds of casualties. In the meantime, Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi appealed to Saudi Arabia to halt what he described as blatant Emirati intervention in his country, supporting separatists fighting to control the interim capital, Aden; likewise, the Yemeni government condemned the UAE airstrikes on its forces. In its turn, the UAE's Foreign Ministry, in a statement, confirmed the airstrikes on the temporary Yemeni capital, Aden, targeting "terrorist militias." However, the attacks were at the expense of the government forces, which caused heavy losses. These attacks tilted the balance in favor of the formations of the Southern Transitional Council, which took control of the interim capital, Aden, effectively turning the page on President Hadi's rule.
Starting from the events of August and progressing through the negotiations that led to the signing of the "Riyadh Agreement" on November 5, 2019, up to the efforts to implement the agreement, Saudi Arabia faced revealing challenges to its influence in the face of escalating Emirati influence. The Saudi-Emirati competition became evident, notably in the prolonged conflict in the Sheikh Salem area of Abyan between the internationally recognized government forces supported by Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and the forces of the Southern Transitional Council, supported by the UAE, on the other hand.
Riyadh Agreement
Throughout the years of the war, the UAE engaged in a series of covert and surprise operations to impose a new reality based on its perspective, driven by concerns that any stability in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the region would undermine its interests. Thus, it invested in creating guarantees of instability and planting numerous mines by fueling regional and local tendencies, in addition to a long list of sequential events. One can cite and trace that through its surprise operations that disrupted the situation in Sheikh Salem, all the way leading to the escalation in Shabwa, gaining control and imposing a new reality there. Subsequently, its venture extended towards Al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadramaut, with an open appetite to engulf the Hadramaut Valley and the eastern regions of Yemen, at the expense of Saudi influence in its last areas in Yemen.
All attempts to structure and integrate the various armed formations backed by the coalition under a unified command were thwarted. The latest was a committee led by Major General Haitham Qasim, tasked with studying the status of all formations and preparing a plan for their structure and integration. This committee was commissioned by the Presidential Leadership Council, whose formation was announced in Riyadh on April 7, 2022, closing the page on President Hadi, who assumed the presidency on February 21, 2012, succeeding President Saleh as part of the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism.
“The issue of armed groups' weaponry in Yemen is one of the fundamental and root problems that profoundly impact the state's existence, its present, and future. It represents a voracious beast consuming both major and minor achievements”
The Armed Groups in Yemen
The issue of armed groups' weaponry in Yemen is one of the fundamental and root problems that profoundly impact the state's existence, present, and future. It represents a voracious beast, consuming both major and minor achievements. The ongoing war in Yemen has exacerbated the problem of armed groups, characterized by regional and international involvement marked by lightness and improvisation. One of its prominent features is the support of armed groups in confronting opposing armed factions and groups, creating multiple allegiances, connections, and regional entanglements within the context of proxy wars.
After more than nine years of war, the prominent actors dominating the scene include the Houthi group, the Southern Transitional Council, formations of the Islah Party, Salafist formations, Tariq Saleh's formations, the internationally recognized government, and the Hadhrami National Council. The latter—the Hadhrami Council—was announced following the visit of the Southern Transitional Council leadership to Al-Mukalla with its forces and armored vehicles, holding a meeting of the National Assembly there. Meanwhile, civil political parties and forces were marginalized.
The regional parties involved in the Yemeni war and its crises have secured all the necessary resources and means to sustain these entities and groups, becoming real actors in ensuring the perpetuation of the war and the expansion of its disastrous effects. Consequently, they have accomplished, as one of their most notable achievements, a torn country divided into cantons, controlled by various armed groups, each governing hundreds of thousands of inhabitants through primitive methods. This retreat contradicts the aspirations that Yemen's generations within the Yemeni national movement struggled for over decades. It also goes against the accumulation of Yemen's institutions, gains from its emerging democratic experience, and the margins of rights, freedoms, and civil society liberty.
Further, the positioning of Yemeni factions on the ground and in the political arena, forcefully imposed by regional parties over the nine years of war, does not reflect the actual and true strengths of these factions based on their inherent capabilities. Instead, it mirrors the regional and international powers' perception of a fragmented Yemen tailored to protect their interests. It serves as a determinant for conflict lines, control boundaries, and the movement of interests and weights.
Conclusions
In tracking the state of Yemen through its various stages, numerous issues related to the situation of the armed forces emerge as a central theme, overshadowing all other challenges and issues. This includes distortions in the current situation in Yemen, with all its implications and outcomes. The impact of the weaknesses, distortions, and divisions within the Yemeni armed forces extends beyond the political state, affecting the country economically, politically, security-wise, militarily, and socially. It goes further to undermine the existence of the state and society, turning Yemen into a regional and international threat. Therefore, addressing the issues of the Yemeni armed forces requires a comprehensive approach, starting with a thorough review, research, and in-depth study to accurately diagnose all challenges and problems. This serves as a necessary preamble to conceptualize the process of rebuilding the Yemeni armed forces in a modern scientific manner, covering legislation, structures, governance, institutions, unity of command, control, and coordination, human resource integration, combat doctrine, military academies and their curricula, and updating their weaponry, mechanisms, and operations, as well as accountability and compliance mechanisms. This approach should ensure the independence of the armed forces from political conflicts and executive authority, concurrently with implementing reforms in the security sector on both national and local levels. This stands as a top priority for Yemen's recovery and stability, paving the way to transform Yemen into an "effective" and "legitimate" political entity.
Further, the armed forces, under the regimes of the September and October revolutions, originated from the primitive unification processes of groups and armed formations that participated in the revolutions. These processes primarily relied on randomness, improvisation, and the urgent need for mobilization, detached from the requirements of building a professional national army according to well-thought-out scientific plans within the framework of defined modern military science parameters. This includes the processes of integration, rehabilitation, armament, structuring, force distribution, and the development of a national combat doctrine. Consequently, popular armed formations retained their allegiances to various centers of power and influence outside the framework of the regular military institution. This led to the stronghold and dominance of diverse neural, regional, tribal, ideological, sectarian, and factional orientations within the armed forces, accompanying the rounds of deadly conflicts.
Yemen, in its northern and southern parts, lived between the years 1962 and 1990 under two republican regimes, each accumulating various gains. Together, they faced, albeit to varying degrees, the challenge of diverging from their regional surroundings and the problems of cycles of bloody struggle for power and instability. During the same period, both the northern and southern parts of Yemen had five presidents each, predominantly military figures, along with successive governments. Violence was the prominent mechanism of competition for power, opposition to it, accountability, and change during that period. This occurred under the dominance of totalitarian regimes incapable of accommodating diversity and managing it, and with a political system unable to secure mechanisms for handling political and cultural competition, disparity, and the life cycles of state and societal transformations. The political system also struggled with mechanisms for acquiring, holding accountable, and peacefully transferring power.
Similarly, the process of building the military institution since the declaration of Yemeni unity on May 22, 1990, until the year 2010, was merely a long journey of haphazard accumulation. It was burdened with the legacies of political conflicts preceding the declaration of unity between the two parts, in addition to new issues such as the aftermath of the Summer 94 war, the six wars in Saada and their repercussions, the files of political deadlock from inheritance to electoral registry disturbances, the issue of the integrity and reliability of elections, the failure of the presidential system, as well as the files of administrative and economic failure, the inefficiency of services, institutions, and apparatuses, the rise in unemployment and poverty, and the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption that eroded state agencies and institutions.
Over decades, numerous extraordinary opportunities to build a state with strong institutions, particularly the military, were regrettably squandered. This was driven by the desire to remain in power and monopolize it, followed by the impulse to inherit it as a primary driver for building the armed forces. Their function became confined to protecting the ruling authority rather than safeguarding the state and society. These factors contributed to the accumulation of hollow structures, despite the enormous resources being consumed by black holes. Consequently, armies with diverse loyalties emerged, differing radically in their combat doctrines, financial budgets, recruitment criteria, training opportunities, and even the quality of sustenance. Non-national loyalties were multiplied, in addition to the sharing of various state institutions and military, security, and civilian entities. The situation witnessed waves of fictitious recruitment. Then, the fingerprint system for personnel in the defense and interior ministries was hindered; military numbers were presented as gifts and favors; promotions, appointments, and retirements were subject to political whims rather than the stipulations of military service law. The emergence of gifted brigades (those surrendered and handed over their weapons to armed groups during the war, by order of the commanders) reinforced militias and tribal pockets within the military institution. The army was armed with war surpluses from World War II markets, and despite the scarcity of modern weapons, they were destroyed under American supervision. The state lacked any plan to monopolize weapons and legitimate means of force, leading to the widespread possession of various types of arms by tribal groups, non-regular formations, and individuals. This occurred on a broad scale, along with the centers of influence disrupting the process of discussing and approving the gun possession law since the early 1990s.
In addition to all of that, the most prominent challenges that have impacted the military institution at various stages are the legitimacy and legality crisis of the ruling authorities, the state of obsolescence and deterioration in visions, as well as in structures and mechanisms, amid governance deficiencies within the military institution in legislation, regulations, structures, and frameworks. There's also the exclusion of specialized competencies that could contribute to the institutional development of the armed forces, coupled with the lack of modern, professional, and academic military schools and academies.
Moreover, the regional and international interventions have had a profound impact on the military institution, particularly with the leaning of foreign relations towards subordination and submission. This was prominently manifested through engaging in conflicts, wars, and crises by proxy, coupled with the political system's lack of independence, leadership, and vision based on plans and strategic goals aligned with the principles and standards of modern military sciences and a stripped-down national perspective.
Further, the continued betting on normalizing and demarcating the boundaries of blood, gunpowder, and war, and the ongoing process of Yemen's fragmentation as planned, along with efforts to complicate the situation and exacerbate problems. Many resources have been harnessed to create and sponsor illegal armed formations through recruitment, arming, training, financing, and operation, in accordance with conflicting island demarcations, on borders of blood and gunpowder, reinforcing areas seized by terrorist organizations and violent groups. In the war, these organizations found an opportunity to rebuild their formations in a non-Yemeni region that is waiting for opportunities to regionalize and internationalize its activities.
Despite the destructive cycles of political conflict with their numerous events, the disappointment lies in the persistence of factors and elements, both motivating and fueling these conflicts, isolated from documentation, research, scrutiny, and study. This has hindered the ability to learn from these lessons, address them, and prevent their recurrence. In addition to the absence of strategic plans and goals based on modern methodological and scientific foundations, governing the directions and operations of the military institution and ensuring its ability to carry out the tasks and responsibilities assigned to it under all circumstances. As a result, many events remained puzzling and open to interpretation, regardless of their significant importance.
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