Yemeni Recruits in Proxy Wars Beyond Their Borders

A Historical Overview of Recruitment, Motives, and Consequences: From Ottoman Jihadism to the Russia-Ukraine War
Mohammad Hassan Al-Shaibani
December 22, 2024

Yemeni Recruits in Proxy Wars Beyond Their Borders

A Historical Overview of Recruitment, Motives, and Consequences: From Ottoman Jihadism to the Russia-Ukraine War
Mohammad Hassan Al-Shaibani
December 22, 2024
Yemeni Recruits on the Russian-Ukrainian Border

A Historical Footnote

In the early 1980s and shortly before, many Yemenis from both the north and south volunteered to fight alongside Palestinian factions in Lebanon against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Similarly, hundreds of Yemeni soldiers participated in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) under Iraqi military command. These two cases need to be read slightly differently from the perspective of legitimacy and political biases.

Throughout various stages of Yemen’s ancient and medieval history, the recruitment of Yemeni fighters into foreign conflict forces and participation in wars beyond Yemeni geography was a prominent feature of military mobilization. The harsh, arid environments (tribal and Bedouin areas) served as strategic reservoirs for fighters,  who were easily swayed by monetary incentives, religious slogans, and other enticements. As a result, these recruits often became the backbone of armies that expanded northward, eastward, and westward. Further, entire families abandoned their homes and villages in Yemen, resettling in new lands they reached, where they later integrated into the social and cultural fabric of those communities.

From Forced Labor to a Profession

If we trace instances of fighter recruitment over the past century, we find numerous examples highlighting their intricate circumstances and motives. During World War I (1914–1918), the Ottomans recruited hundreds of Yemeni youths into their forces and ranks, both voluntarily and forcibly, as they did with young men in other territories under their control, particularly in the Levant and Iraq, in what became known as "Jihadiya" (military jihad). Most of these Yemeni recruits never returned, due to their deaths in war and epidemics, succumbing to the harsh conditions of war. A few survived and settled in new lands, forming families in countries like Jordan, Palestine, and Syria, with some reportedly establishing roots in Balkan countries where Ottoman forces fought their final battles to defend territories they had held since their westward expansion into Europe in the 18th century.

“During the Yemeni Republican-Monarchist War (1962–1970), hundreds of tribal fighters joined the ranks of royalist forces, driven primarily by the substantial financial support provided by Saudi Arabia to its allies from the Hamid al-Din family and the remnants of the ruling regime of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, which had been overthrown by the Egyptian-backed September Revolution. As a result, this conflict turned Yemen into a battleground for regional proxy conflict. In this context, money played the most significant and decisive driver in recruitment than ideological or sectarian loyalty.”

Similarly, during World War II (1938–1945), the global powers—both the Allies and Axis—recruited thousands of fighters from across the Third World countries, including Yemen. Yemeni recruits joined and fought alongside Italian and German forces in Africa, particularly Ethiopia, and fought alongside French and British forces in colonies like Aden, Djibouti, and Somalia. The economic desperation was the primary driver of this recruitment, with illiteracy and ignorance playing a significant role in facilitating it. This phenomenon is poignantly captured in the literary work of Mohammed An’am Ghaleb’s iconic poem, “The Stranger,” written during his studying years in Cairo in the late 1940s:

"The war began a month ago,

Inflation is a fire.

Trading for crumbs is futile,

The war began a month ago,

And the recruits revel in seeking their final pleasure.

War is lucrative; war is my job.

I am the brave warrior,

Skilled in firing shots,

My bullet never misses its mark.”

The poet’s reflection on war’s grim reality continues:

"I fought not to defend my homeland,

I fought for bread.

Alongside fascists,

And in the black nights amidst blood and fire,

I saw comrades—Yemenis—on the opposing side.

We fought each other, not for ideals.

It mattered little who lived or died.”

Through these lines, Ghalib eloquently portrays the harsh realities of those who fought not out of patriotism or ideals, but out of sheer necessity for survival.

Likewise, during the Yemeni Republican-Monarchist War (1962–1970), hundreds of tribal fighters joined the ranks of royalist forces, driven primarily by the substantial financial support provided by Saudi Arabia to its allies from the Hamid al-Din family and the remnants of the ruling regime of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, which had been overthrown by the Egyptian-backed September Revolution. As a result, this conflict turned Yemen into a battleground for regional proxy conflict. In this context, money played the most significant and decisive driver in recruitment than ideological or sectarian loyalty.

Religious Proxy Wars

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, the Islamist movements mobilized thousands of youth, including Yemenis, to fight alongside forces opposing the Afghan government backed by Soviet troops. The massive financial support, Western intelligence backing, and organized training enabled these movements to establish their own strong military and security arms within Yemen’s power structure. These newly formed forces were first tested in Yemen’s Central Region wars (between the National Democratic Front and the Islamic Front) and later in the 1994 Summer War, where the returning “Mujahideen” from Afghanistan spearheaded the invasion of southern provinces. This campaign led to the dismantling of the cultural, social, and military structure and systems of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, accompanied by widespread destruction of landmarks, institutions, shrines, and mausoleums.

Shortly after the 1994 Summer War, hundreds of Yemeni fighters affiliated with Islamist movements joined the First Chechen War (1995–1996), fighting alongside Arab fighters from other countries against Russian forces under President Boris Yeltsin, and later during the Second Chechen War (1999–2009) under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, where they became known as “Arab Mujahideen in Chechnya.” Similarly, during the Bosnia and Herzegovina war (1992–1995), Yemeni fighters engaged in another “holy war” under religious motivations, accruing significant gains for the movement in the post-Cold War unipolar world, where extremist and isolationist movements such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda began to rise.

Following the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Islamist groups sent hundreds of their fighters to the Anbar Desert with facilitation from Iran and Syria. Al-Qaeda reestablished itself outside Afghanistan under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, later evolving into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group expanded its influence in Iraq and Syria, becoming a key player in proxy wars marked by sectarian undertones. Its eventual defeat in 2017 resulted in Shiite sectarian dominance across Iraq’s state apparatus.

“The involvement of Yemenis in proxy wars, under national and religious banners, has always been driven by the country’s political and economic turmoil and enduring instability throughout various historical periods. Such practice has claimed the lives of hundreds of young men who, faced with closed doors and limited options, found themselves choosing "paid death" abroad as an alternative to dying of hunger at home.”

Die at Home or Abroad

In Yemen’s ongoing war, now entering its tenth year, the warring parties have recruited tens of thousands of young men to sustain their conflict and military campaigns. The dire economic conditions faced by families who lost their livelihoods during the years of war have pushed many families to send their sons into military formations as a means of survival.

As I reviewed journalistic reports about students avoiding enrollment in Yemeni universities and dropping out of secondary education, I found one of the clearest reasons to be their preference for joining military factions supported by the warring parties. This choice is driven by the financial rewards they receive, especially in a context of limited opportunities, halted salaries, and the collapse of the local currency's value.

On the other hand, the killing of former Yemeni diplomat Ahmed Al-Sahmi, who served at Yemen's embassy in Moscow and was fighting alongside Russian forces in their war against Ukraine in May, highlights this troubling phenomenon. His death sparked widespread questions about why diplomats, students, and asylum seekers from Yemen are being drawn into a war that has no connection to their national interests. The answer lies in Yemen’s prolonged political instability, economic collapse, and deteriorating living conditions, which have left many with no better option than “paid death.”

Conclusion

The involvement of Yemenis in proxy wars, under national and religious banners, has always been driven by the country’s political and economic turmoil and enduring instability throughout various historical periods. For many, war became a profession that required little qualification, with networks of brokers and recruiters playing key roles in exploiting this vulnerability. These networks often resorted to deception, promising recruits routine security jobs in neighboring countries, only for them to find themselves on distant battlefields like Ukraine. Such practice has claimed the lives of hundreds of young men who, faced with closed doors and limited options, found themselves choosing "paid death" abroad as an alternative to dying of hunger at home.

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