On multiple occasions, Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a leader in the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement, has called upon the Islah Party to engage in dialogue and reconciliation, and to form a national unity government. He has expressed his group's readiness to provide all possible and fair guarantees to build trust with the Islah Party. Similarly, Ali Al-Qahoum, another prominent leader in the same movement, never misses an opportunity to capitalize on any situation, whether to invite the Islah Party to dialogue or to embarrass them through leaks about the positive relations between the two parties.
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From time to time, news emerges about a rapprochement between the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah Party) and the Ansar Allah movement (Houthis) through unofficial and unconfirmed leaks from either side. While the Islah Party, through its media office, denies any rapprochement or even bilateral dialogue with the Houthis, there are indications and positions from influential leaders within both the Islah Party and the Houthi movement suggesting a growing rapprochement between the two sides.
Between the denials and confirmations, there are field indicators, as well as political and historical factors that contribute to fostering the bilateral rapprochement between the two components. However, at the same time, there are also internal and external political obstacles that work to widen the gap and rift between them.
In this discussion, we will address the commonalities between the Islah Party and the Houthi movement, the previous agreements made between them, and the factors and variables that might contribute to the process of their bilateral rapprochement, as well as the obstacles that could hinder the meeting of the two parties.
“The Muslim Brotherhood viewed Ayatollah Khomeini as the first religious leader since the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. The first delegation to land at Tehran's airport to offer congratulations shortly after the revolution was led by Abul A'la Maududi and represented various Islamic groups.”
Historical Background
The Ansar Allah movement is a Shia religious group loyal to Iran, while the Islah Party is a Sunni political party that represents an ideological extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite denying any formal ties with them to appease Saudi Arabia, which hosts the party's leaders. Nevertheless, the Islah party does not deny its ideological connection with the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Houthis intersect as both are religious groups, each governed by a supreme guide, both believing in clandestine activities, and both requiring a pledge of allegiance from their followers. While the Brotherhood seeks to restore the Islamic Caliphate, the Houthis aspire to establish divine governance.
There is a longstanding relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution. The Brotherhood viewed Khomeini as the first religious leader since the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. The first official delegation to land at Tehran's airport to congratulate Imam Khomeini shortly after the revolution in February 1979 was led by Abul A'la Maududi. Additionally, Iran's current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has openly acknowledged his admiration for the Muslim Brotherhood thinker Sayyid Qutb, having translated two of his books into Persian: "This Religion" and "Milestones." Several Brotherhood leaders have acknowledged that they were initially optimistic about the Iranian Revolution before it became radicalized and adopted a policy of exporting the revolution beyond Iran.
Given these historical relationships, there is potential to rebuild rapprochement between the two groups, especially in light of the current developments and the behavior of the Arab ruling elites, who demonize anything Islamic—particularly the Sunni Islamic Movement (the Muslim Brotherhood). This situation compels the Brotherhood to seek rapprochement with the Shiite stream (Iran) as a political necessity for survival.
“The Houthis never miss an opportunity to capitalize on any situation, whether to invite the Islah Party to dialogue or to embarrass them through leaks about the positive relations between the two sides.”
Factors Contributing to the Islah-Houthi Rapprochement
First: internal factors
The Islah Party is currently experiencing an unannounced estrangement from all components of the Yemeni legitimacy, starting with the General People's Congress, the Socialist Party, the Nasserist Party, extending to the Salafists, and ending with the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Each party harbors suspicion towards the others.
Despite repeated attempts to mend the rift within the legitimacy components, all efforts have failed. The latest of these attempts was the formation of the National Coalition of Yemeni Political Forces, which was led by Rashad Al-Alimi before he became the head of the Presidential Leadership Council. Since its establishment, the coalition's achievements have been limited to a few laudatory statements in support of the Arab Coalition.
As the internal rift widens between the components of legitimacy—more specifically between the Islah Party and the other components of legitimacy—new anti-Islah alliances are forming. These include the coalition between Tareq Saleh's Congress Party and the Southern Transitional Council, along with some Salafist groups against the Islah Party. Additionally, there are joint agreements between the Socialist Party and the Nasserist Party aimed at countering the Islah Party, which has come under criticism from all factions for monopolizing the decision-making within the legitimacy. The Islah Party is also accused of exerting unilateral authority and control in the cities of Marib and Taiz, while its presence has significantly diminished in other provinces, particularly in the southern provinces controlled by the Southern Transitional Council. The STC has openly declared its efforts to eliminate the Islah Party from the south under the guise of "counter-terrorism," according to official statements from the Council.
While it is impossible for the Southern Transitional Council or others to completely eradicate a doctrinal party as large as Islah from the southern governorates, it is not unlikely that the Transitional Council could succeed in diminishing Islah's influence, limiting its presence, and suppressing its cadres. This has indeed happened, with dozens of the party's leaders and members having been assassinated.
Regarding the Islah Party's relationship with the General People's Congress (Ahmed and Tarek Saleh's faction), it is not much better than its relationship with the STC, being more of a cold war and dormant hostility that quickly intensifies and flares up during the anniversaries of the February 11 Revolution or the attack on the Al-Nahdain Mosque.
Additionally, there is intense competition between the Islah Party and the Congress Party over control of Taiz Governorate. Tareq Saleh controls the coastal districts of Taiz, which account for only four out of 23 districts—Al-Mokha, Dhubab, Mawza, and Al-Wazi'iyah. These districts are not commensurate with the ambitions of a political party leader, let alone a member of the Presidential Leadership Council. Thus, Islah recognizes the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Tareq Saleh's Congress Party or Ahmed Ali's Congress Party, if not virtually impossible, given the UAE's influence over the decisions of the Saleh's sons.
If it weren't for the Emirati intervention, the Islah Party would be much closer to the General People's Congress Party, as the two share many commonalities and have a long history of strong strategic relations.
As for the Socialist and Nasserist Parties, they view the Islah Party as having monopolized the largest share of power and having taken control over the city of Taiz. Despite this, they acknowledge that the Islah Party has made the highest number of human sacrifices on the battlefronts.
Several joint statements have been issued by the Socialist and Nasserist Parties against the Islah Party. Ironically, all political factions within the legitimacy framework reject any genuine rapprochement with the Islah Party.
Meanwhile, the Houthis have consistently sought to court the Islah Party, repeatedly calling for dialogue with them.
On multiple occasions, Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a leader in the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement and spokesperson for the so-called Supreme Committee for National Reconciliation, has called upon the Islah Party to engage in dialogue and reconciliation, and to form a national unity government. He has expressed his group's readiness to provide all possible and fair guarantees to build trust with the Islah Party, according to him. Similarly, Ali Al-Qahoum, another prominent leader in the same movement (responsible for political party affairs), never misses an opportunity to capitalize on any situation, whether to invite the Islah Party to dialogue or to embarrass them through leaks about the positive relations between the two sides.
“Some Islah leaders believe that it would be better for the party to initiate rapprochement with the Houthis from a position of equality rather than from a position of subordination to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”
Second: external factors
The Islah Party faces an intractable hostility from the UAE, which seems insurmountable, even for a temporary truce. The UAE has taken it upon itself to fight Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, across the Arab world. In addition to this clear and declared UAE hostility, the Islah Party feels greatly let down by Saudi Arabia, to the extent that Saudi Arabia is on the verge of sacrificing its relationship with Islah in favor of building a new relationship with the Houthis. Even if the Islah were to maintain its relationship with Saudi Arabia unilaterally, it might find itself compelled, under Saudi directives, to negotiate with the Houthis and accept the terms agreed upon between Sana’a and Riyadh. Therefore, some Islah leaders believe it would be better for the party to take the initiative in establishing ties and initiate rapprochement with the Houthis from a position of equality, rather than from a position of subordination to the Kingdom.
Additionally, Qatar plays a significant role by hosting many Islah leaders and maintaining unique relations with the Houthis. It is in Qatar's interest to see the formation of an alliance between the Islah and the Houthis to counter the coalition of the Southern Transitional Council and the Congress party, which is supported by the UAE, Qatar’s arch-enemy.
Similarly, Oman, which hosts moderate Houthi and Islah leaders, might also play a role in this rapprochement. Additionally, the Israeli aggression against Gaza has positively influenced the rapprochement of Islah Party’s stance with that of the Houthis. Prominent Islah voices have praised Ansar Allah's stance in their support and solidarity with the Palestinian people in Gaza.
“The Specialized Criminal Court in Sana'a has approved the lifting of the seizure on the properties of dozens of Islah Party members residing in Sana'a, including mid-level party leaders, and the process is still ongoing.”
Indicators of Islah-Houthi Rapprochement:
“The head of the Islah Party in Marib was the first Islah leader to commend the Ansar Allah group’s supportive stance towards the people of Gaza. In June, he sent a joint message to Sultan Al-Arada and Mahdi Al-Mashat, proposing an initiative to reopen the closed roads to and from Marib.”
The response came quickly from Ali Al-Qahoum, who stated: "We consider the initiative presented by Sheikh Mabkhout Aboud Al-Sharif, head of the Islah branch in Marib, as a step forward in the national dialogue process with them, and a positive initiative to move forward in closing the chapter on the past, accepting the principle of dialogue to resolve and overcome all internal issues, and looking to the future with a sense of national responsibility. This also includes addressing challenges and threats, uniting in support of Palestine, preserving Yemeni unity, confronting foreign colonial projects, and shutting the door to external interventions."
He added, "No matter how much we differ; in the end, we are all Yemenis before we belong to any parties."
There have been previous indicators of rapprochement between the two sides, particularly in 2014, when the Islah Party quickly signed the Peace and Partnership Agreement with the Ansar Allah.
All of this confirms the possibility of achieving Islah-Houthi rapprochement once again.
“However, some members of the Islah Party believe that the Houthi group has not demonstrated goodwill towards Islah in several contentious issues, most notably revealing the fate of the Islah Party's Supreme Council member, Mohammed Qahtan, whose whereabouts have remained unknown since 2015.”
Obstacles to Rapprochement
Therefore, observers argue that the previous agreements between the Islah Party and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group were merely a temporary measure, a makeshift solution, or a brief respite in the ongoing conflict.
In conclusion, the nature of the on-the-ground reality, political changes, mutual interests, and the extent of political, military, and economic pressures compel any political party to adopt a certain stance towards the other.
Despite the ideological and sectarian differences between the Islah Party and the Houthi movement, politics has its own logic, one that recognizes neither permanent enmity nor eternal friendship.
