Today, the reader of Ibn Khaldoun philosophies cannot help but stare in amazement and horror; as for astonishment, it comes from the depth of his analysis of the nature of the tribe in its brutality, lethargy, and fear. As for horror, it is that now, as we read his analysis, we find only a slight difference in fanaticism between what was in his era and what exists today, except in terms of the change in the means and ways of living.
Ibn Khaldoun presents us philosophical insights into what the state is and its hypothetical nature. As he mentioned in the Al Muqaddima, Chapter Forty-Three, on the authority of Al-Mawbdhan, Bahram bin Bahram, while he was advising the king: “O king! Kingship’s glory is not absolute except through the law, performing obedience to God, and acting under His orders and prohibitions, and there is no excellence for the law except through the king, and there is no glory for the king except through men, and there is no base for men except with money, and there is no way to money except through building, and there is no way to build except with justice, and justice is the scale set between human beings, set by the Lord and appointed the king as his deputy to execute justice.”
In fact, it is similar to the words of Anushirwan when defines the state as: “Kingship is achieved through soldiers, soldiers are attained through money, money is collected through taxes, taxes are obtained through urbanization, urbanization is accomplished through justice, justice is through reforming officers, and reforming officers is through the integrity of ministers. Above all, the king shall inspect the condition of the subjects himself and his ability to discipline them so that he owns them and they do not possess him.”
Moreover, in his discussion of what was reported from “the book attributed to Aristotle on politics circulated among the people,” there is “a valid part of it, except that it is not complete and is not given its due proof and is mixed with others. In that book he referred to these words that we quoted from Al-Mawbdhan and Anushirwan and included them in the closest circle in which the greatest thing to say about is his saying: “The world is like an orchard, its fence is the state, the state is an authority by which the Sunnah survives, the Sunnah is a policy governed by the king, the kingship is a system supported by the soldiers, the soldiers are agents supported by money, money is a livelihood collected by the subjects, the subjects are slaves safeguarded by justice, Justice is customary and with it life is made right, the world is a garden, then it returns to the beginning of the words. These are eight words of political wisdom that were linked to each other and whose miracles were reflected in their issuances.”
So, these are the most significant elements in building any state in the era of Ibn Khaldoun, and the eras in which Aristotle, Al-Mawbdhan, and Anushirwan lived, and they roughly represented the state with its primitiveness, respectively, in development.
Nonetheless, in light of a situation in which the weakness of the state is consistent with the failure to tolerate the unity of contradictory fanaticism in one major intolerance assumed by Ibn Khaldoun, every fanaticism seeks to extract what it can for itself at the expense of the collapsing state. As long as we assume in our time that fanaticism is no longer monopolized in the person of the tribe, but rather may be in the person of the sect or group, then if any fanaticism is able to conquer its surroundings, it “naturally seeks to conquer the people of other fanaticism who are away from it.”
According to Ibn Khaldoun’s view, kingship - or power in the language of the present era - is “the goal to which fanaticism leads,” and with fanaticism, according to his perspective, there is protection, defense, demands, and every matter that is agreed upon,” because “human beings, by human nature, need in every meeting a savior and a ruler who will separate them from one another. He must be overcome by that fanaticism, otherwise he will not be able to do that. This victory is kingship, which is greater than leadership because leadership is only authority and its owner is followed, and he has no oppression over them in his rulings, but as for kingship, it is dominance and ruling by oppression.”
The Intolerant State
This particular state of nervousness is what we experience in the past and today in different, and perhaps contradictory, ways in terms of behavior, but they are fundamentally harmonious in terms of goal and purpose. There are countless examples that can be narrated of the manifestations of this fanaticism from the first day of the emergence of the revolutionary and liberation movement in Yemen until today. Instead of concealing itself in the interest of the stability of the state, it increases brutality in the face of the latter.
When a tribe, community, or group, as a sectarian group with endless interests, dares to impose its vision on the ruling (king), it does so because it feels that this leader is weak; either because of his corruption and failure, or because of the corruption of his employees to the point that they burdened him and he was no longer able to control them.
If the feeling of the tribe, community, or group is confirmed, it will not stop making its demands, because “when the person of fanaticism reaches a rank, he demands what is above it.” What is above it in the current situation is the regime, which is the rank of mastery over others. Because through it, the ruler finds “the path to overcoming and subjugating,” and “a single tribe, even if it contains separate houses and multiple factions, must have a fanaticism that is stronger than all of them, that overpowers and subjugates it, and that all the fanaticisms merge into it, and it becomes as if it were one great fanaticism...”
However, in light of a situation in which the weakness of the state is consistent with the weak possibility of the unity of the contradictory fanaticisms in one major fanaticism assumed by Ibn Khaldoun, every fanaticism seeks to extract what it can for itself at the expense of the crumbling state. As long as we assume in our time that fanaticism is no longer monopolized in the person of the tribe, but rather may be in the person of the sect or group, then if any fanaticism is able to conquer its surroundings, it “naturally seeks to overcome the people of other fanaticism far away from it. If it agrees with it or opposes it, they are fighters and rivals, and each of them has the right to overcome its possessions and her people.,” and this is “the condition of the divided tribes and nations all over the world.”
The difficulty of the issue today is that, even if the current sects are able to prevail over their opponents, they will not follow Ibn Khaldoun’s law of merging with the defeated sects to form a unified unity. On the contrary, they will instead increase its humiliation every time it becomes stronger.
At the time when it triumphs and multiplies its power, it seeks “a goal of conquest and control which is higher than the first objective and further away, and so always until it matches the power of the state with its strength. If it reaches the top of the state and has no objection from the state’s guardians and the people of the sects, it will seize control of it and snatch power from its hands, and the kingdom will be entirely its own.”
However, according to Ibn Khaldoun, “if its power fades, this is not compared to the hierarchy of the state, but rather compared to its need for support from the people of fanaticism, the state will organize its guardians to support them according to its objectives.” In the situation we live in, it is impossible for this to happen, and what is most likely is that fanaticism is the one which will wipe out the remaining aspects of the state.
The zealous striving of fanaticism to erase the concept of the state, not according to modern standards, but rather according to primitive standards, is clearly evident in specific and concrete actions. These fanaticisms have come to present themselves as an antithesis to the state by generalizing its customs and behaviors, and not only to one of the most important symbols of civilization in the region, turning it into a model for disdaining the city and its status and turning it into a mere follower to the extent that urban fanaticism advances and becomes its guide to the future coming from the past.
It is unacceptable for any state whose fanaticism lies in its judicial institutions, tools of coercion, and hierarchy of responsibility, to accept that a tribe, group, or a region to invade its authority, whatever the justifications, and does not accept being governed by the desires and customs of external fanaticism, regardless of their idealism, or even its justice, as a substitute for the law and the justice.
When fanaticism turns into an arbitration body in the state structure, this state will have lost its justification for existence because its existence without its prestige makes nothingness the best option, especially for those who are accustomed to living under the fanaticism of the state. The contemporary state’s fanaticism is justice that is settled in the upright balance. It is not possible to imagine a contemporary state without that balance, no matter how it tilts. When the state loses its balance, the fanatical person must come with his balance carried on an imaginary monument and while his palm filled with nothingness.
The tribe leaves its distant pastures to invade the city, and imposes its convictions and customs even on what is supposed to be an institution governed by written laws, and the city itself becomes nothing more than a village in the grip of its sheikh who has a firm grip on every neck.
You certainly bear witness that the state has lost its integrity (law, judiciary, soldiers, etc.); Because it has become humiliated, and submitted to other fanaticism, “that is because humiliation and submission break the burden of fanaticism and its severity.” If we are certain that this has happened, then the state has been unable “to defend, and whoever is unable to defend is more likely to be incapable of resisting and demanding.”
The metropolis in question is an example of civil life for ages due to its diverse and mixed population composition, where people do not come together on the basis of blood and kinship, but on the basis of coexistence and institutional regularity in the affairs of daily life - in this metropolis, which preceded half the world in its civility. It is no longer strange to see state officials judging the affairs of their institutions in front of a tribal sheikh coming from ancient times, dressed in a solemn modern dress. The strangest thing that happens is when a tribe, community, or group travels to the city to disrupt the rule of law or to protect a perpetrator, and sets up tents in the middle of the city to shed the blood of revolutionaries and justice together.
Further, such metropolis is not an exception to the rest of the metropolises with regard to this issue, but its exceptionalism lies in its deep-rooted civilization. How many fanatic rebellions against judicial rulings we have witnessed while it can be appealed within the judiciary system itself? Rather, rebellion against the judiciary is hatred for it and a desire to take its place in resolving disputes, regardless of their type and nature. Accordingly, the citizen becomes a target for all upcoming fanaticism.
Seeking support from the past
It is unacceptable for any state whose fanaticism lies in its judicial institutions, tools of coercion, and hierarchy of responsibility, to accept that a tribe, group, or a community to invade its lair, regardless of the justifications, and it does not accept to be subject to the desires and customs of external fanaticism, regardless of their idealism, or even its justice, to replace the law and the justice.
The respected state does not rule outside the laws and legislation it has enacted and legislated. Conflicts of interest between state institutions or their representatives should not be a reason for the various sects to move to support their representative in that institution, as the person - even if he belongs to the tribe or sect - is ultimately a state employee under state administration and outside the guardianship of the tribe.
The natural position of the tribe is to be under the authority of the state, and it is not possible for it to escape from it. A failed official always needs someone or power to support him and defend his failure! Therefore, it is not strange for this loser to strengthen his tribe, community, and group against (the state) whenever an obstacle appears before him or his failure revealed among the public.
In conclusion, a state that invokes the past instead of the future is truly an impossible state
