After the publication of the book "Anarchy Rules: Saving Failed States" by the American researcher Stephen Ratner, the term "failed state" has become popular in scholarly usage, replacing the term "soft state" coined by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in his 1968 book "Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations." In this book, Myrdal analyzes the lack of societal discipline in Asian countries and many developing countries, characterized by disregard for and lack of enforcement of laws, civil service and public officials disobedience, widespread corruption, and their impact on economic development failures.
Stephen Ratner did not provide a clear definition of the concept of "failed state," but rather, like other researchers, he referred to a number of countries that fall within the semantic scope of that concept, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Somalia, and the newly formed states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These are states that doubted their viability at that time.
General Characteristics of Failure
Regardless, many researchers agree that a "failed state" is one that is unable to maintain its existence as a viable political and economic unit. In such states, the central government is extremely weak or ineffective to the extent that it does not have actual control over part of the state's territory and is unable to perform some state functions. Such a state becomes ungovernable and lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the international community due to the erosion of the state's own authority.
To further elaborate, there are general characteristics of a failed state, including the government's inability to enforce its will over the people and territory, protect its borders, provide public services, implement public policies, safeguard civil liberties and human rights, and engage with other countries. Additionally, a failed state lacks a stable political and economic system and is characterized by the erosion of legitimate authority.
Despite official American statements warning of the danger of failed states to US national security, as they provide fertile ground for terrorist movements, the US administration, in practical terms, has contributed significantly to the formation of failed states.
The evidence for this lies in the fact that the United States, along with other developed countries in the Western world, encouraged the Arab Spring revolutions not out of love and a desire to improve the lives of Arab peoples, but rather to dismantle their political, social, and economic structures. They worked, on one hand, to prolong the period of conflict by providing limited support to the protesters, allowing them to undermine existing political systems, while at the same time preventing their complete collapse, aiming to weaken all conflicting parties under the guise of a zero-sum warfare strategy, where neither side emerges victorious.
“The erosion of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime can be attributed to several political reasons, including the lack of desire to establish a state based on institutions and the rule of law. Additionally, the aftermath of the 1994 war played a significant role, as it led to the dismissal of thousands of southerners from the military, security forces, and civil government positions, creating a solid foundation for the southern movement.”
In reality, many symptoms of a failed state began to appear during the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh because his regime did not work towards establishing an institutional state. In such a state, these institutions represent the people, and power is independent, legal, and impersonal. Everyone is truly equal before the law in practice, not just in words.
Furthermore, the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh did not give any importance to the formation of a rule-of-law state. In such a state, all activities are subject to legal rules, and both citizens and state institutions abide by the highest laws, eliminating arbitrariness, tyranny, and a police state. However, under Saleh's rule, there was an absence of law and order.
It is well known that the life of states is not eternal, and the Yemeni state during the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh was not an exception to this rule. His regime began to deteriorate significantly at the beginning of the current century, paving the way for the February 11th revolution in 2011.
On the other hand, the erosion of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime can be attributed to several political reasons, including the lack of desire to establish a state based on institutions and the rule of law. Additionally, the aftermath of the 1994 war played a significant role, as it led to the dismissal of thousands of southerners from the military, security forces, and civil government positions, creating a solid foundation for the southern movement.
Containment Strategy of the Revolution
In addition to those factors, there were significant economic and social factors that contributed to creating the conducive conditions for the February 11th revolution in 2011. The most important among them was corruption, with Yemen ranking 146 out of 178 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2010. Additionally, the low per capita income, averaging $1300 annually, meant that nearly half the population was living on less than two dollars a day. While the unemployment rates also soared, reaching more than 50% among the youth, due to the failure of economic growth to match population growth, which stood at 3% annually. (see: "The Economic Roots of Social Disturbances in Yemen" - Carnegie Middle East Center website, March 2011).
Likewise, Western countries and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states worked to contain the February 11th, 2011 revolution in a manner that served their strategies. They aimed to prevent the uprising forces from decisively resolving the conflict at the center of governance while simultaneously allowing them to achieve victories in certain areas of the country. This approach was intended to facilitate the formation of multiple political entities. Consequently, the nine-year war served as a transition from a state of "failed state" to a state of "non-state.
The evidence confirming Yemen's transition from a "failed state" to a "non-state" status is numerous. The most important of these is the absence of a unified state within Yemen's geographical boundaries, and the lack of most characteristics, elements, and functions of the state in any of the existing political entities. It is widely known that the policies of these entities are subject to the influence and agendas of regional and Western countries.
One might argue: Why not consider every current political entity in Yemen as a state in the legal sense, and therefore it is incorrect to say that Yemen is in a state of non-state, as each political entity exhibits some characteristics of a state?
Those characteristics, according to legal scholars, include: the existence of a defined territory, a permanent population, the authority to make laws, impose taxes, the presence of a bureaucratic apparatus, sovereignty and independence internally and externally, defined borders, and the right to exercise legitimate violence.
Three Potential Scenarios
There is no doubt that all of these characteristics are essential qualities of any state, and based on them, the state can be defined in a general sense. However, this approach is not accurate and correct in proving that every Yemeni political entity at the present time is a state. This is because the people within the country do not recognize the existing boundaries between those entities, nor does the international community. Moreover, many of those characteristics in the existing political entities lack a legal nature. Finally, these entities are incapable of performing the basic functions of a state.
Indeed, it's worth mentioning in this context that the United Nations does not have the authority to determine whether a particular entity is a state or not. This matter is considered a question of international legal recognition by other states and governments. This theory is known as the constitutive theory of the state, which asserts that the international recognition is the essential condition for the existence of a state.
Contrary to that theory, the declarative theory of state asserts that the existence of a state is independent of international recognition. This principle was affirmed in Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, signed in 1933 by a few American states. However, as widely known, the international community does not operate according to this idea.
In conclusion, at the current stage of contemporary Yemeni history, we are faced with three possibilities: either external players in Yemen's affairs work to maintain the status of non-state for a prolonged period, relegating the Yemeni crisis to oblivion; or Yemen is divided into several states; or an end is put to the current state's condition, and a new Yemeni state is formed that satisfies all conflicting parties.
