The recent conflict that erupted between the internationally recognized Prime Minister and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is a partner in the same government, over the decision by Prime Minister Ibn Mubarak to empower the Central Organization for Control and Auditing to audit the accounts of the Aden Ports Corporation reveals that the UAE has not yet completed its ambitious project of acquiring a strategic share in Yemeni resources, including the Aden ports, which it aims to control through the Abu Dhabi Ports Company, following the annulment of a controversial agreement signed between Saleh's regime and the Dubai Ports Company in 2008 by the Basindwa government in 2013. Consequently, it became evident then that the Dubai Ports' acquisition of the port was intended solely to hinder it in favor of its own ports, following extensive pressure on the Singaporean company and its partners who operated the container port until the late 1990s.

For this reason and other factors, there has been a delay in making progress on several issues related to the Yemeni war, issues that the UAE (the second party in the coalition) controls and influences through its proxies. One of these issues is the matter of roadways. The forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) are obstructing the opening of routes between the northern and southern governorates, such as the Sana'a-Aden road via Al-Dhalea, the Al-Bayda-Abyan road via Aqabat Thara, the Taiz-Aden road via Karish and Al-Shuraija, and the main roads connecting Al-Bayda and Marib with Shabwah.

The two roads that were recently opened, Al-Bayda-Ma’rib, and Al-Hawban–Al-Kamp, in the east of the city of Taiz, Saudi Arabia, had a clear influence on its allies in Taiz and Ma’rib (the Islah party) to proceed with this step. Prior to this, the primary driver was the mutual desire of both parties to achieve this breakthrough through Saudi-Iranian understandings, mediated by Oman and Qatar, with the aim of building on it for the upcoming settlement project that Saudi Arabia is eager to complete to escape the predicaments it found itself in due to its flawed vision, the corruption of its internal tools, and the betrayal of its coalition partners. Here, it is necessary to pause at a question that still occupies the public mind: how did the Houthis, who originally closed the roads and tightened the siege on Taiz city for nine years, come to take the initiative to open the roads, particularly the road east of Taiz? The answer certainly lies in the benefits they will gain, as we will try to explain in context.

Likewise, it is widely known that the UAE, through its tools and proxies, has worked to undermine successive governments, weakening them, and in return, it has facilitated the Houthis' efforts to build their military, security, and economic capabilities to tighten their grip on the north through various covers. To achieve this goal, the UAE played a blackmailing role within the Saudi-led coalition and resorted to flooding it with senior officers in the coalition leadership who were bought off, or through disruption and confusion operations on the ground. Therefore, when Saudi Arabia realized this well-crafted trap, it rushed to implement its agreement with Iran under Chinese auspices in March 2023, before engaging in successful unilateral negotiations with the Houthis on many details. However, just as they were close to the signing, the Gaza war erupted, which the Houthis cleverly exploited and used to blackmail everyone, including Saudi Arabia, which has become facilitating many operations for them.

“The Houthis, with Iranian and Omani support and cover, have managed to exert significant influence over Saudi Arabia, enabling them to extract concessions as they please. In turn, Saudi Arabia appears willing to cater to them as if they were a spoiled child whose every desire is fulfilled, as long as they do not cause excessive chaos in the surrounding region, though disturbances and chaos within their own territory are considered acceptable.”

Moreover, the UAE's true colors were fully revealed during the Gaza war through its complete alignment with the occupying state, which commits the worst forms of destruction, killing, and displacement against Palestinians, their land, and their properties. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which was also on the verge of normalizing relations with the occupying state, decided to slow down a bit to avoid completely damaging its image as the spiritual leader of the region. Saudi Arabia set conditions for proceeding, including the establishment of a two-state solution, ending the war, and beginning reconstruction efforts. Conversely, this war served as a significant gift for Iran and its proxies in the region. They presented themselves as supporters of the Palestinian cause and people, cleverly and strategically using the situation to polish their tarnished image as sectarian and authoritarian forces responsible for the chaos in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Consequently, the Houthis, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and Hezbollah have repositioned themselves as revolutionary liberation forces rather than tools of a sectarian expansion project centered in Tehran and its religious institutions.

Within this entangled equation, the steps of convergence and divergence concerning the Yemeni file can be read in several ways. The Houthis, with Iranian and Omani support and cover, have managed to exert significant influence over Saudi Arabia, enabling them to extract concessions as they please. In turn, Saudi Arabia appears willing to cater to them as if they were a spoiled child whose every desire is fulfilled, as long as they do not cause excessive chaos in the surrounding region, though disturbances and chaos within their own territory are considered acceptable. The UAE, on the other hand, will do everything in its power to disrupt through its tools and proxies until it achieves its goals in Yemen, which are to control islands, ports, and strategic passages in the ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea (such as Socotra and its surroundings, Mayyun Island, Hanish Island, the ports of Mukalla, Aden, Mokha, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait). These areas are now controlled by forces loyal to the UAE, not for development but to disrupt and keep them away from the Chinese Silk Road project, ensuring stability for its ports in Jebel Ali and Abu Dhabi. The internationally recognized government, which operates on the basis of respecting the host in Aden, is the last to influence this entanglement, as its main sponsor in Riyadh has become an agent for its adversary, the Houthis, and its partner in Ma’ashiq, which controls the ground, can expel it at any moment if directed by the sponsor in Abu Dhabi with a finger's point.